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"This... [is] a turning point for the Community. Just as the challenge of the 1980s was completion of
the Internal Market, the reconciliation of environment and development is one of the principal challenges
facing the Community and the world at large in the 1990s."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its creation in 1957, the predominant goal of the European
Community2 ("EC") has been economic: the establishment of a common
market in Europe where goods, persons, services, and capital move freely.3 As
a result of numerous legislative, judicial, and political decisions, the EC has
made significant progress in achieving that goal. The process of integrating the
different national markets, however, has in some ways forced and in other
ways allowed the Community to broaden its focus to include other goals. The
goal of environmental protection, for example, has become increasingly
important in recent years, both on a Community and an international level.4
Nevertheless, pursuit of this new goal sets the stage for conflicts with the more
established ideal of free trade and forces the Community to weigh these
competing objectives.5
I. Executive Summary, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TOWARDS
SUSTAINABILrTY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY PROGRAMME OF POLICY AND ACTION IN RELATION TO THE
ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 9 (Mar. 27, 1992) [hereinafter FIFTH ACTION
PROGRAMME].
2. The term "European Community" refers to the political, economic, and legal entity created under
the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [hereinafter EEC TREATY], as
amended by SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT [hereinafter SEA], and TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [hereinafter
TEU]. The Treaty of Rome appears at 298 U.N.T.S. 3. The SEA is set out in 2 C.M.L.R. 741 (1987).
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which was signed on Feb. 7, 1992, is contained in 31 I.L.M.
247. For the researcher's convenience, a compilation of the Treaty of Rome as revised by the SEA and
the TEU appears at I C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. This Article cites to the last
of these sources as the TEU unless there is a rationale for preferring one of the other sources. Articles
of the TEU that are not included in that compilation are cited to the Maastricht Treaty.
The TEU formally introduced the term "European Union" (EU), which was meant to reflect one
of the treaty's essential aims and to mark a new stage in the integration of the Member States. Although
the TEU is now in effect, the term "European Community" continues to be used interchangeably with
"European Union," see, e.g., TEU arts. 1-5, except when referring to the pre-TEU entity, in which case
"European Community" is the correct term. There are currently 15 members of the Union: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3. TEU arts. 2-3.
4. See generally Konrad von Moltke, A European Perspective on Trade and the Environment, In
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 93, 93-108 (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds,
1993) [hereinafter TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT] (discussing emergence and present state of European
environmental policies).
5. LUDWIG KRKMER, FOCUS ON EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 15-16 (1992). This confrontation
between trade and environmental concerns has also become increasingly common on the international
plane, as was evident in the recent NAFTA and GAIT negotiations. See Daniel C. Esty, Integrating
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As a result of amendments to the Treaty of Rome ("Treaty") included in
the Single European Act ("SEA") in 1987 and the Maastricht Treaty (the
"Treaty on European Union" or "TEU") in 1993, the Community specifically
identified environmental protection as one of its fundamental objectives and
committed itself to basic environmental principles such as the precautionary
and polluter-pays principles.6 Community institutions 7 have expressed this
commitment by passing numerous directives and regulations to ensure
protection of the air, land, water, and wildlife. These institutions have also
conducted a series of "environmental action programmes" and held symposia
to study environmental problems.8 Further, the European Court of Justice has
reinforced the Community's obligation in this area by repeatedly emphasizing
that environmental protection is an "essential objective" of the Community.9
Decisions by the ECJ, both before and after the passage of the SEA,
emphasize that environmental concerns deserve special attention and may in
certain cases outweigh other fundamental Community concerns such as the free
movement of goods.10 Together, these actions and statements by Community
institutions reflect a movement away from the traditional single-minded pursuit
of free trade within the Community and toward a balancing of free trade goals
with environmental goals.
The Community's recognition of the importance of environmental
protection to its future raises questions about whether and how Community law
should be altered to accommodate this concern. The amendments to the Treaty
of Rome and the decisions by the ECJ are important steps, and Community
legislation and Member State enforcement of that legislation will further
promote this objective. These steps alone, however, will not solve every issue.
The diversity of opinion among the Member States concerning the optimal and
most feasible level of environmental protection will continue to challenge the
Community, and the differences among the Member States in their ability to
Trade and Environment Policy Making: First Steps in the North American Free Trade Agreement, in
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMEr, supra note 4, at 45, 45-55.
6. See, e.g., TEU arts. 100a(3), 130r-t; Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl., art. B.
7. The principal Community institutions are the Commission, the Council, the Parliament, and the
European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court").
8. The Community issued Environmental Action Programmes in 1972, 1973, 1977, 1983, 1986,
and 1992, and has passed over 200 environmental measures. See Resolution of the Council on the
Continuation and Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the
Environment, 1973 O.J. (C 112) 1; Council Resolution, 1977 O.J. (C 139) 1; Council Resolution, 1983
O.J. (C 46) 1; Council Resolution, 1987 O.J. (C 328) 1; Executive Summary in F=T ACTION
PROGRAMME, supra note 1; see also KRX.MER, supra note 5, at 8 (detailing EC institutions and policies
for fostering environmental protection). The Community has also organized symposia focusing on
specific environmental issues, such as the Commission's 1992 Vehicle Emissions Symposium staged in
Brussels in September 1992.
9. See, e.g., Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 4629 [hereinafter Danish
Bottles]; Case 240/83, Procureur de la R6publique v. Association de d6fense des brQleurs d'huiles
usag es, 1985 E.C.R. 531, 549-50 [hereinafter ADBHU].
10. See, e.g., Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, 1992 E.C.R. 4471, 4479-80 [hereinafter
Wallonia Waste]; ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 549.
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pay for environmental measures further complicate the issue. Germany, the
Netherlands, and Denmark have favored more stringent levels of environmental
protection than the other Member States." The recent accessions to the Union
of Sweden, Finland, and Austria, states that historically have had strict
environmental measures, will presumably strengthen this group favoring stricter
Community standards. Nevertheless, opinion on the stringency of Community-
wide environmental standards will continue to be diverse."
When Community institutions decide to enact new environmental
measures, this diversity of opinion often sparks debate about the appropriate
level of protection. If, as is often the case, the level chosen as the
harmonized13 Community standard represents a compromise between these
conflicting views, Member States favoring a higher level of environmental
protection face the question of whether they can enforce that higher level
within their own borders by applying national law. Before the SEA, the well-
established rule of Community law prohibiting Member States from imposing
more stringent rules in harmonized areas absolutely precluded such attempts
to "go it alone.' 14 The SEA's introduction of Articles 100a(4) and 130t
11. See KRiMER, supra note 5, at 37-38,54-55; James Cameron & Ruth Mackenzie, Environmental
Law and Policy Development in the European Community After Maastricht 7 (unpublished manuscript
on file with author). Grants from the Union's Structural or Cohesion Funds to less wealthy Member
States may minimize some of these differences in the ability of Member States to pay for environmental
measures. For a discussion of these Funds, see Diane Ryland, The Cohesion Fund: A Question of
Balance, 3 EuR. ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (1994); David Wilkinson, Using the European Union's Structural
and Cohesion Funds for the Protection of the Environment, 3 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL.'
L. 119 (1994).
12. The entry into force of the European Economic Area ("EBA") may lend additional voices to
these debates because, although EEA signatories cannot formally participate in Community
decisionmaking, they are subject to Community regulation (with the exception of Switzerland) and may
thus seek to influence the drafting of Community legislation. See Karl G. Hcyer, The Role of the Nordic
Environmental Policies in the European Union: Highest Common Standard or Lowest Common
Denominator?, 3 EUR. ENVTL, Dec. 1993, at 2, 2. The EEA is an agreement between the EC and its
Member States, including its new members, and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. By
contrast, accession by any of the Eastern European states that have expressed interest in joining the
Community (including Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) may add a different influence due to
their serious environmental problems and the costs involved in their abiding by even the current
Community standards. See Executive Summary, in FIFrH AcnON PROoRAMME, supra note I, at 89-90;
Cameron & Mackenzie, supra note 11, at 18.
13. "Harmonization" is an important concept in European Community law. Because one of the
primary objects of the Community is to improve the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital across national borders, much Community legislation is dedicated to establishing mandatory
Community-wide standards and thus eliminating differences in rules among Member States that create
obstacles to this free movement. For example, the establishment of a harmonized Community rule on
the type of catalytic converters required in vehicles, see Council Directive 70/220, 1970 O.J. (L 76) 17 1,
enabled car manufacturers to overcome the manufacturing and marketing obstacles that had resulted from
differing national laws.
14. Case 148178, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629, 1642-44. This rule prohibiting
Member State legislation in Community-harmonized areas is similar, although not identical, to the
American doctrine of federal preemption of state law. According to this rule, once the Community has
harmonized an area (not always an easy matter to determine, as discussed infra part VI.B), the Member
States may not enforce national standards or rules that differ in any respect from the Community
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created an exception to this formerly ironclad rule by permitting Member
States to enforce more stringent rules even after harmonization, provided that
certain requirements are met.15  According to accepted principles of
Community law, these articles represent the only avenues currently available
for Member States to enforce their more stringent national standards.
16
This Article departs from the accepted doctrine of Community law by
arguing that the Community should liberally interpret the exceptions provided
by Articles 100a(4) and 130t in the environmental sphere to allow their
maximum application. It also argues that the Community should create
additional exceptions to permit Member States the broadest possible discretion
to enforce stricter standards. This, suggestion relies on the underlying purpose
of Articles 100a(4) and 130t, other Treaty amendments effected by the SEA
and the TEU, and numerous legally binding and nonbinding
pronouncements 17 of Community institutions that reflect the Community's
commitment not simply to environmental protection, but to a high level of
protection. To fulfill this commitment, Member States should be both allowed
and encouraged to impose stricter environmental measures. Such stricter
measures are consistent with the Community's environmental policies and
would better ensure achievement of Community objectives in this sphere.
While stricter environmental measures will further the important
Community aim of environmental protection, they may in some instances
create the very types of barriers to the free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital that the Common Market was designed to eliminate. A
hypothetical national law placing stricter limits on vehicle emissions provides
standards or rules.
15. SEA arts. 18, 25 (introducing Articles 100a and 130t to Treaty of Rome). Article 100a of the
Treaty is the legal basis for most Community harmonization measures. It requires only a qualified
majority vote by the Council for the adoption of such measures rather than the unanimity required under
Article 100, which was the only legal basis for harmonization before the SEA. To compensate for this
more liberal voting requirement, Article 100a has several significant qualifications. Paragraph four, for
example, allows Member States to continue to apply national law in harmonized areas under certain
circumstances, one of which is environmental protection. For a discussion of Article 100a, see infra part
IV.B.1. Similarly, Article 130t states that the adoption of harmonized measures based on Article 130s
cannot prevent Member States from enforcing stricter environmental standards, provided that certain
requirements are met. TEU art. 130t. Compare SEA art. 18 (supplementing Article 100 of Treaty of
Rome with qualified majority voting provision of Article 100a) with SEA art. 25 (adding unanimous
voting requirement of Article 130s to Treaty of Rome) and TEU art. 130s (repealing unanimity
requirement of Article 130s). Article 130s is a provision specifically relating to the environment.
However, because prior to the TEU it required unanimous voting, it was not employed as often as Article
100a, even for environmental measures. For more analysis of Article 130t, see infra part IV.B.2.
16. See David Wilkinson, Maastricht and the Environment: The Implications for the EC's
Environmental Policy of the Treaty on European Union, 4 J. ENVTL. L. 221, 232-33 (1992).
17. The ECJ has ruled that interpretations of Community law may give weight to even nonegally
binding Community documents. See Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles,
1989 E.C.R. 4407, 4421 (1991).
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one such example. '8 In 1972 the Community issued a harmonizing directive
that required Member States to adopt legislation establishing similar standards
for vehicle emissions.19 If Sweden were now to pass a law establishing
stricter standards than the directive and requiring all vehicles driven in Sweden
to abide by the stricter standards, air quality in Sweden (and neighboring
countries) would presumably improve, but the law would have a disruptive
effect on the manufacture and marketing of vehicles in the Community. Cars
manufactured in Italy that met the Community's harmonized standards under
the directive could not be driven in Sweden. Hence, Sweden's law would
create a barrier to trade among the Member States. Moreover, if the Italian car
manufacturer began equipping some or all of its vehicles so that they would
comply with the Swedish law, the end result would subvert the Community
lawmaking hierarchy: the Swedish legislature, and not Community institutions,
would in effect be establishing vehicle emissions standards for the
Community20
This Article's argument in favor of allowing stricter national standards to
preserve the environment thus treads on what has until recently been a primary
concern of Community law: the elimination of trade barriers. Despite this
conflict, the Article asserts that Community law has already adjusted and must
continue to adjust its priorities to take environmental concerns into account. As
the European heads of state and government affirmed over twenty years ago,
Economic expansion is not an end in itself.... It should result in an improvement in the
quality of life as well as in standards of living. As befits the genius of Europe, particular
attention will be given to intangible values and to protecting the environment, so that
18. German smog regulations from the 1980s effectively set stricter emissions standards than this
Community directive, leading the Commission to initiate proceedings against Germany, which were later
closed when the Community standard became stricter. See KRkAER, supra note 5, at 184. A problem
written by Frank Emmert, lecturer of European law at the University of Basel, for the 1994 European
Moot Court Competition addresses a similar situation. See European Moot Court Competition Problem,
1994 (on file with Yale Journal of International Law).
19. See Council Directive 70/220, supra note 13. A "directive" is legislation that binds the Member
States with respect to the result to be achieved but allows them to choose the form and methods to
achieve that end. TEU art. 189. Under the terms of each directive, Member States must pass
implementing legislation by a certain date. See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN
COMMUNrTY LAW 204-05 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing EC case law regarding time limit for implementing
directives). It is generally accepted that Directive 70/220 effected a "total harmonization" of this field,
thereby precluding any conflicting national legislation. See, e.g., LunWio KRAmR, EUROPEAN
ENViRONMENTAL LAW 338 (1993).
20. Such arguments are at the heart of the debate about whether stricter environmental standards
should be tolerated on a national level, or whether they threaten the entire legal structure that allows the
Community to fight aggressively for the removal of trade barriers. The United States's own experience
with emissions standards regulation is relevant to this debate. For some time now, California has required
stricter vehicle emissions standards than the federal government, thereby forcing auto manufacturers to
alter production to accommodate these different standards. Although the higher California standards have
thus created obstacles to interstate commerce, the legal system has tolerated these barriers because of
the strong environmental interests at stake. See Clearing the Air, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1995, at 47, 47.
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progress may really be put at the service of mankind.. '
To remain true to these principles, Community institutions must balance free
trade and environmental protection ideals to improve the quality of life for
Europeans in both an economic and a non-economic sense.
Part II presents a general discussion of the Community's development in
terms of its objectives and concerns. The Article then examines in Part III the
Community's commitment to environmental protection in light of the TEU and
other legal instruments, activity by the Community institutions in the
environmental sphere, and decisions by the ECJ. Part IV examines the
development of European Community law and policy concerning Member
States' enforcement of higher environmental standards within their borders.
Part V sets out the theoretical argument that permitting higher national
environmental standards would better enable the Community to reach its
environmental goals. Part VI suggests three modifications of Community law
to permit stricter national environmental standards: liberally interpreting the
exceptions offered by Articles 100a(4) and 130s, applying a presumption
against a finding of harmonization in the area of the environment, and the
"heresy" of creating another exception to allow stricter environmental laws
even in harmonized areas. The Article concludes by discussing optimal and
interim solutions for Community regulation of the environment.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY'S OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS
Both the dilemma and the opportunity posed by allowing Member States
to enforce stricter environmental standards are best understood in the context
of the development of the Community's objectives and activities. From its
inception, the Community has had large ambitions, pledging itself to both
economic and non-economic goals. Indeed, the wording of the Treaty of Rome
demonstrates that the Member States did not view the Community as merely
another free trade agreement - a European version of the GATT - but
instead saw it as the framework for a new postwar Europe that would enjoy
greater economic and political stability and improved living conditions for its
citizens.22
21. Declaration of the Heads of State, in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, SIXTH
GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcnivmEs OF THE COMMUNrTIEs, 1972 at 7, 8 (1973) [hereinafter 1972
Declaration of Heads of State].
22. The preamble begins as follows: "DETERMINED to lay the foundations of an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe... AFFIRMING as the essential objective of their efforts the
constant improvement of the living and working conditions of their peoples... ' EEC TREATY pmbl.;
see also Case 26/62, N.V. Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Ondememing van Gend & Loos v.
Nederlands administratie der belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 [hereinafter Van Gend en Loos] ("ITihe
Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only
member states but also their nationals.'); DERRICK WYATF & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 3-8 (3d ed. 1993) (describing various objectives leading to Treaty of Rome).
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The Treaty's structure provided important means for making this vision
a reality. Most importantly, its central provisions aimed to create a common
market by 1970 in which goods, persons, services, and capital could move
freely.23 To this end, the Treaty empowered political institutions 24 to enact
legislation binding on the Member States and their citizens. 5 The ECJ was
empowered to rule on Member State compliance with Treaty obligations,
26
the legality of Council and Commission acts and omissions,27 and the
interpretation of Community law.2 Exercising these powers, the ECJ created
a legal framework that makes Community law supreme to national law.29 The
Treaty also included provisions regarding financial contributions by the
Member States to the Community3" and established a common agricultural
policy, 3' a common commercial policy towards third countries, 2 and an
antitrust policy.
33
In spite of the broad scope of EC institutions and activities, realizing these
objectives has been, and continues to be, quite difficult. In the early years,
differences among the Member States' views on the scope of the Community's
powers, political and economic constraints, and the monumental task of
23. EEC TREATY arts. 8, 9-37, 48-73.
24. The primary political institutions created by the Treaty of Rome are the Parliament, which is
referred to in the Treaty of Rome as the "Assembly" and whose members, as of 1979, are directly
elected by the citizens of the Member States; the Council, comprised of the ministers of the Member
States; and the Commission, whose members are chosen by the Member States. The States appoint one
to two Commissioners each, depending on the State's population, and each member has responsibility
for a Directorate General ("DG") that oversees one or more subjects. See id. arts. 4, 137-63, amended
by TEU arts. 4, 137-63, D (adding European Council); WYATT & DAS-WOOD, supra note 22, at 19-36.
25. The legislative procedures are generally described in Articles 100-02 and 137-63 of the Treaty
of Rome but are influenced by provisions elsewhere in the Treaty depending on the subject matter at
issue. See, e.g., TEU art. 228 (discussing procedures for entering into agreements with third countries).
See generally WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 37-51 (explaining legislative process).
26. EEC TREATY arts. 169-72. Because the Community lacks the sort of "federal judiciary" that
the United States has, its courts are the courts of the Member States. The exceptions to this rule are the
Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, but their jurisdiction is rather limited. See TEU arts.
168-88.
27. Id. arts. 173-76.
28. Id. art. 177. Pursuant to this article, national courts may pose questions of Community law to
the ECJ in an interlocutory proceeding. The Court's resolution of these questions is binding on the
referring court, Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken, 1969
E.C.R. 165, 179-80, and arguably on all other courts in the Community, HARTLEY, supra note 19, at
280-81.
29. The Court of Justice held in a landmark decision that Community law could have "direct
effect" - that is, it could create rights on which an individual could rely even if national law were to
the contrary. See Van Gend en Los, 1963 E.C.R. at 13; see also Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. at 1641-42 (1980)
(holding that Community law is supreme over national law).
30. EEC TREATY arts. 199-209.
31. Id. arts. 38-47.
32. Id. arts. 110-16.
33. Id. arts. 85-94.
34. A tension inheres in the Community system between the promotion of national interests (those
of the individual Member States) and the promotion of supranational interests (those that transcend
national interests and aim instead for goals that benefit the Community as a whole). One aspect of this
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ensuring the free movement of goods limited the Community's ability to
devote substantial attention to the pursuit of non-economic goals. 35 The focus
during this period was therefore on eliminating trade barriers between the
Member States and establishing a common market.36 To accomplish these
goals, the Community passed legislation aimed at harmonizing standards and
rules in a variety of areas.37
Harmonization was crucial to the establishment of a common market
because it meant that private industry had to comply with only one set of rules
rather than with multiple sets, thereby promoting efficiency and increased
circulation of goods within the Community. Harmonization also promoted the
Community's sphere of influence at the expense of the Member States because
the Member States were no longer entitled to issue their own regulations in an
area after the issuance of harmonization legislation.38
One of the Community's principal weapons in eliminating trade barriers
has been Article 30 of the Treaty. This article is important because it
constitutes the primary restraint on Member State enforcement of stricter
environmental standards when no harmonization has occurred.3 9 Article 30
forbids the Member States from maintaining quantitative restrictions on trade
between Member States or "measures having equivalent effect" to such
restrictions.' Based on decisions by the Court of Justice, the phrase
"measures having equivalent effect" has a wide reach and includes "[a]ll
trading rules enacted by member States which are capable of hindering,
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade."' 1 Given
this broad definition, it is not surprising that the Court has found many types
of national laws to violate this provision, including national environmental
protection measures.42
tension is the differing views Member States have historically held regarding the scope of the
Community's powers relative to national powers. See generally HARTLEY, supra note 19, at 8-47
(explaining division of powers among EC political institutions); Joseph Weiler, The Community System:
The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1981 Y.B. ER. L. 268 (analyzing particular nature of
Community supranationalism).
35. See Renaud Dehousse, 1992 and Beyond: The Institutional Dimension of the Internal Market
Programme, I LEAL IsSUES EuR. INTEGRATION 109, 109-12 (1989).
36. See Phillip M. Hildebrand, The European Community's Environmental Policy, 1957 to '1992 "
From Incidental Measures to an International Regime?, 1 ENVTL. POL. 13, 15, 17-20 (1992).
37. See Dehousse, supra note 35, at 11-12.
38. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. at 1642-43, 1644. For further development of this point, see infra part IV.
39. See, e.g., Case C-131/93, Commission v. Germany, ,1994 E.C.R. 3302 [hereinafter German
Crayfish].
40. TEU art. 30.
41. Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837, 851-52.
42. See, e.g., id. (law requiring certificate of origin from exporting State to accompany imported
goods bearing certain names); German Crayfish, 1994 E.C.R. at 3316-23 (law prohibiting import of
crayfish except for research and educational purposes); Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. at 661-64 (law
requiring certain alcoholic content in beverages with certain names). See generally WYAwr &
DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 211-24 (discussing Article 30 cases). Some commentators have argued
that the Court has begun to restrict the reach of Article 30. See, e.g., L. Hancher & H. Sevenster, Case
1995].
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Two routes exist for derogating from Article 30: Article 36 and the rule
enunciated in Cassis de Dijon.43 Article 36 states that restrictions that are
justified on grounds such as "the protection of health and life of humans,
animals or plants" are exempted from Article 30 if they do not "constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States."' In addition, the ECJ has required an examination of
whether the law "constitutes a measure which is disproportionate in relation
to the objective pursued, on the ground that the same result may be achieved
by means of less restrictive measures, or whether.., such a system is
necessary and hence justified under Article 36."45
By contrast, the Cassis de Dijon "rule of reason" provides a broader
derogation but is only relevant when the national law in question is not
protectionist - the law must apply equally to domestic and imported goods.
The Cassis de Dijon rule provides that "obstacles to free movement within the
Community resulting from disparities between the national laws must be
accepted in so far as such rules, applicable to domestic and imported products
without distinction, may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements recognized by Community law" and are "proportionate
to the aim in view."46
The Cassis de Dijon ruling established the principle of "mutual
recognition" of national rules meeting its requirements and hence departed
from the previous approach favoring uniformity in national laws. This
acceptance of differences in national laws coincided with a renewed interest
C-2190, Commission v. Belgium, 30 COMMON MKT. L. REy. 351, 361 (1993) (suggesting that Article
30 may no longer cover indistinctly applicable measures - those that burden domestic and imported
goods equally). But see Peter von Wilmowsky, Waste Disposal in the Internal Market: The State of Play
After the ECJ's Ruling on the Wallon Import Ban, 30 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 541, 541 n.1 (1993)
(explicitly rejecting Hancher and Sevenster theory). The Court's decision in Cases C-267/91 and C-
268/91, Criminal Proceedings Against Keck and Mithouard, 1993 E.C.R. 6097, may lend further support
to this argument. The ECJ held there that national legislation prohibiting certain selling practices did not
fall within Article 30 even though it might hinder inter-State trade. The Court noted that the legislation
did not intend to have this effect on inter-State trade; criticized traders' increasing tendency to rely on
Article 30 even when the laws at issue lack a protectionist intent; and concluded that, where national"
laws prohibiting certain selling practices are indistinctly applicable, such laws fall outside Article 30. Id.
at 6130-32. Another reading of the Keck decision is that it creates a de minimis exception to Article 30:
where the effect on inter-State trade is minimal, the measure does not fall within Article 30. Future
decisions of the ECJ will no doubt clarify whether a change in its Article 30 jurisprudence has occurred.
A change that accepted "indistinctly applicable measures" could strongly impact the ability of Member
States to enforce national environmental measures, which in general are indistinctly applicable.
43. Case 120178, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fldr Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649
[hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
44. TEU art. 36.
45. Case 124/81, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1983 E.C.R. 203, 236.
46. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629 (restating, with immaterial modifications, Cassis de
Dijon's "rule of reason"). The Court has identified environmental protection as a "mandatory requirement
which may limit the application of Article 30," id. at 4630, and thus the Cassis de Dijon derogation may
apply to national laws aimed at environmental protection if its other requirements are met.
[Vol. 20: 227
1995] Preaching Heresy 237
in expanding the Community's powers.' At a summit conference in 1972, the
heads of state and government of the Member States acknowledged that many
economic, social, and political problems were beyond their individual
capabilities. They therefore aimed to achieve a European Union covering all
relations of the Member States48 A subsequent summit conference further
emphasized this objective,49 and several reports were drawn up outlining the
framework of the proposed Union.
Even while some in the Community pressed for expansion into new areas
of activity, frustration mounted concerning the Community's failure to fully
achieve objectives already envisioned in the Treaty, particularly the
establishment of a common market. In furtherance of this objective, the
Commission issued a report describing an impressive legislative program that
emphasized the removal of the remaining trade barriers50 This paper served
as the basis for negotiating the SEA, a 1987 amendment of the Treaty of
Rome. The SEA, primarily concerned with integrating the national markets, set
the end of 1992 as the deadline for completion of the internal market." The
SEA also expressly increased the Community's powers, thereby reflecting the
parallel trend within the Community to expand the breadth of its activities.
Environmental protection was one of the areas added in this first expansion of
the Community's competencies through amendment of the Treaty.
2
The second expansion of the Community's competencies occurred when
the Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993. The Maastricht Treaty
amended the Treaty of Rome in a number of significant respects.53 In keeping
47. This pattern of allowing somewhat more differentiation among the Member States in return for
an agreement to expanded Community powers has been repeated at other junctures in the Community's
development, notably in the Treaty amendments effected by the SEA and the TEU. For example, while
the SEA established qualified majority voting, it also enacted Article 100a(4), which allows for
derogations from harmonizing measures. Similarly, although the TEU expanded the Community's
competencies, it also required the incorporation of the principle of subsidiarity into all Community
actions.
48. See E. P. Wellenstein, Unity. Community, Union - What's in a Name?, 29 COMMON MKT.
L. RnV. 205, 207-08 (1992).
49. Id.
50. Dehousse, supra note 35, at 112-14 (citing Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from
the Commission to the European Council, COM(85)310 final).
51. SEA art. 13. The SEA's introduction of Article 100a, which allowed qualified majority voting
for harmonization measures instead of the previous requirement of unanimity, was crucial to the
attainment of this goal.
52. Id. tit. VII; see also Hildebrand, supra note 36, at 23 (explaining different stages of Community
environmental policy and describing it as "gray zone" of Community competence prior to SEA); David
Judge, "Predestined to Save the Earth": The Environment Committee of the European Parliament, 1
ENvTL. POL, Special Issue, Winter 1992, at 186, 188-89 (noting that this inclusion was in large part due
to efforts of European Parliament and arguing that these efforts were part of Parliament's general
"strategy," in wake of first direct elections, to promote public awareness of need to have greater
democratic control over EC's transborder policies).
53. For a general synopsis of the changes wrought by the Maastricht Treaty, see WYATT &
DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 653-73; Trevor C. Hartley, Constitutional and Institutional Aspects of the
Maastricht Agreement, 42 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 213 (1993). The Treaty will again be the subject of
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with its resolution to "mark a new stage in the process of European
integration,"' 4 the Treaty added a number of new Community competencies,
including those in the fields of European citizenship, 55 education,56
consumer protection, 7 and industry,58 as well as two new pillars covering
foreign and security policy59 and addressing cooperation in the fields of
justice and home affairs.60 These developments, which put to rest the idea
that the Community is solely concerned with trade liberalization, are the
natural result of trends within the Community since its inception.
III. THE COMMUNITY'S COMMITMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Development of the Community's activity in the environmental sector
mirrors in many respects its development as a whole. The desire to eliminate
differences in national rules that acted as trade barriers inspired the initial
efforts in the environmental sector, which date from the late 1960s.6" The
Community first evinced an interest in environmental protection for its own
sake in 1972 when the heads of state and government issued their aggressively
pro-environmental declaration 62 and the Community passed its first
"environmental action programme." 63 Subsequent years saw increased
environmental legislation, the ECJ's declaration that environmental protection
was an "essential objective" of the Community,' and Community
involvement in international environmental protection efforts.65  The
environmental breakthrough, however, was the SEA's amendment of the
Treaty of Rome to include environmental provisions. Amendments by the TEU
further solidified the impact of those provisions on Community law. As a
result of this episodic history of environmental reform, the Community's
commitment to environmental protection appears in a number of sources: the
TEU, international environmental conventions, the five Action Programs on the
Environment, environmental legislation, and various statements and decisions
discussion and possible amendment at an intergovernmental conference to be held in 1996. See
Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2, art. N.
54. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl.
55. TEU arts. 8-8e.
56. Id. art. 126.
57. Id. art. 129a.
58. Id. art. 130.
59. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2, art. J.
60. Id. art. K. Other important changes include legislative procedures, see TEU arts. 189-91, the
incorporation of subsidiarity as a general principle, see TEU Art. 3b, and provisions regarding common
economic and monetary policies, see TEU arts. 3a(2), 102a-109m.
61. See, e.g., LUDWIG KRAMER, EEC TREATY AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECroN §§ 1.01-.02
(1990) (canvassing origins of EC environmental policy).
62. See 1972 Declaration of Heads of State, supra note 21.
63. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 63.
64. Danish Bottles, 1989 E.C.R at 4630 (quoting ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. 531 at 549).
65. See infra part rn.B.
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by Community institutions concerning the environment.6
A. The Commitment to a High Level of Environmental Protection in the
Treaty on European Union
The TEU's many provisions regarding environmental protection are the
most important demonstration of the Community's commitment. For example,
the Preamble proclaims that the Member States are determined "to promote
economic and social progress for their peoples, within the context of the
accomplishment of the internal market and of reinforced cohesion and
environmental protection., 67 Article 2 includes among the Community's tasks
the promotion of "balanced development" and "sustainable and non-inflationary
growth respecting the environment. 68  Article 3(k) requires that the
Community develop as part of its activities "a policy in the sphere of the
environment."69 Importantly, Article 100a(3) provides that the "Commission,
in its proposals envisaged in paragraph 1 concerning health, safety,
environmental protection, and consumer protection will take as a base a high
level of protection."'7
Of the TEU's environmental provisions, Article 130r provides the most
comprehensive guidance regarding the scope of the Community's commitment.
Its language merits quoting in full:
Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community. It shall be
based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be
taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the
polluter should pay. Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the
definition and implementation of other Community policies.7
Articles 130r and 100a(3) represent significant undertakings. First, both
66. While only the TEU, international treaties, Community legislation, and decisions by
Community courts are legally binding, less formal statements from Community institutions may still have
legal effect. See generally FRANCiS SNYDER, SOFT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL PRACrICE IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, European University Institute (October 1993) (describing influence and
implications of non-legally binding Commission statements). At the very least, these sources are tools
that the Community courts may use in interpreting Community legislation, particularly when the
legislation cites such documents, as environmental legislation often does. See, e.g., Directive 89/458
amending Directive 70/220, 1989 O.J. (L 266) 1, with regard to European emission standards for cars
below 1.4 liters (citing First and Third Action Programmes).
67. Maastricht Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl., para. 7. As the ECJ made clear in the Van Gend en
Loos decision, when it relied on a phrase in the preamble in its 'ruling, the words in the Treaty's
preamble do have legal significance. See Van Gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 12.
68. TEU art. 2.
69. Id. art. 3(k).
70. Id. art. 100a(3) (emphasis added).
71. Id. art. 130r, § 2 (emphasis added).
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use the phrase "high level of protection." '72 Second, the express requirement
that the Community integrate environmental concerns into all Community
policies has no parallel.73 Third, the invocation of the precautionary principle
also manifests the Community's commitment to environmental protection.
While the SEA contains no definition of that principle, the definition provided
in the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development and adopted
in a number of subsequent agreements provides some guidance:
"Environmental measures must anticipate, prevent and attack the causes of
environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation."74 Application of
the precautionary principle promotes the adoption of those measures most
likely to prevent pollution (i.e., the most stringent) at the earliest possible
stage75 and thus supports a significant level of environmental protection.
Fourth, national and international law protect "fundamental" individual
rights such as health, safety, and consumer protection.76  Placing
environmental protection in Article 100a(3) on par with these individual rights
confirms the Community's commitment to protect the environment at an
enhanced level. Finally, consideration of the underlying purpose of Articles
1 00a(4) and 130t provides further evidence of the Community's commitment.
The Community intended these articles to ensure that Member States would
72. How "high" a "high level" of protection is will be a never-ending point of contention. It cannot
mean environmental protection at any cost because that cost may in some cases be impossible to pay
in practice. See, e.g., Environmentalism Runs Riot, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1992, at 11 (citing Office
of Management and Budget Report calculating cost per life saved of EPA rule on wood preservatives
at $5.7 trillion, roughly equal to U.S. GNP). Nevertheless, the fact that a cost is difficult to quantify does
not mean that the relevant environmental protection measure is impracticable. Application of this
standard, in tandem with such concepts now enshrined in the Treaty as the precautionary principle, will
help in evaluating the legality of proposed Community actions and the methods and means they adopt.
73. KRAmER, supra note 5, at 9-10. The absence of this requirement for other Treaty objectives
does not mean that Community policies can ignore these other objectives. Implicit in the Treaty of Rome
is the idea that Community policies must take into account all Treaty objectives. Environmental policy
is unique, however, because it is the only objective for which there is an expressly stated integration
requirement. Id. To further its environmental obligation, the Commission adopted an Internal
Communication on June 2, 1993, specifying how to ensure the integration of environmental protection
requirements into other Community policies. Cameron & Mackenzie, supra note 11, at 16-17.
74. Bergen Conference, Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development, May 16, 1990, para.
7, reprinted in 20 ENVTL POL'Y & LAW 100, 100 (1990); see also Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, UN Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item
9, at 3. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev. 1 (1992) (Principle 15). See generally James Cameron & Juli
Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of Law and Policy for the Protection
of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INr'L & COMP. L. REv. I (1991) (analyzing precautionary principle).
75. The polluter pays principle may promote a higher level of protection because it will force
polluters to internalize the cost of the pollution into their production costs. Companies that pollute less
will then be rewarded because their cost of doing business will be less than the costs of the heavier-
polluting companies.
76. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 10 ("mhe Single Act intends to bestow a special protection on the
environment").
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not be forced to lower their environmental standards when the Community
passed harmonization measures.
77
B. The Community's Commitment As Expressed in Other Instruments
Other instruments also reflect the Community's commitment to a high
level of environmental protection. On the international level, the Community
is a contracting party to approximately thirty conventions and international
agreements for environmental protection and has been active in the conventions
leading up to those agreements, including the 1992 United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development (UNCED).in Rio de Janeiro. 7 Within the
framework of these agreements, the Community has also taken a leadership
role in lobbying for more stringent standards.79 These international
agreements are binding on the Community institutions and Member States.80
On the Community level, the Community has adopted five "Action
Programmes on the Environment" that provide a blueprint for future
environmental protection actions.8 ' The latest Programme, entitled "Towards
Sustainability: A European Community programme of policy and action in
relation to the environment and sustainable development," not only
incorporates the principles of sustainable development, preventive and
precautionary action, and shared responsibility," but also contains language
77. Commission Communication Concerning PCP Case, 1992 O.J. (C 334) at 8 [hereinafter PCP
Communication] (summarizing Commission Decision of December 2, 1992) (on file with Yale Journal
of International Law); KRAMER, supra note 5, at 10. Articles 100a(4) and 130t can be read as
guaranteeing "that a level of environmental protection established by national law in a particular Member
State can only be lowered with the consent of the State concerned." Id.
78. Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the
Commission to the Council for a resolution on a Community program of policy and action in relation
to the environmental and sustainable development [hereinafter Resolution] in FIFTH ACTION
PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 8 (referring to Community's participation in UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) and to its implementation of Berne and CITES Conventions);
Opinion on the proposal for a resolution of the Council of the European Communities on a European
programme of policy and action in relation to the environment and sustainable development, in FIFrt
ACTION PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 148 (referring to Community's position at the UNCED).
79. See Executive Summary, in FiFrH ACTION PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 84.
80. TEU art. 228(7). The ECJ relied in part on such an agreement in Wallonia Waste in concluding
that a Belgian waste disposal law was compatible with Community law even though it constituted a trade
barrier. Wallonia Waste, 1992 E.C.R. 4470 at 4480.
81. See supra note 8. Adoption of these programs is mandatory pursuant to Article 130s(3), which
states that "general action programmes setting out priority objectives to be attained shall be adopted by
the Council" and that "[t]he Council ... shall adopt the measures necessary for the implementation of
these programmes.' TEU art. 130s(3). The now more than 200 pieces of Community environmental
legislation often refer to these Action Programmes and their recommendations. See, e.g., Council
Directive 91/441 of 26 June 1991 Amending Directive 70/220 on the Approximation of the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Measures to be Taken Against Air Pollution by Emissions from Motor
Vehicles, 1991 O.J. (L 242) 1 (referring to First Action Programme's call "for account to be taken of
the latest scientific advances in combating atmospheric pollution").
82. See Resolution, in FITH ACTION PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 96-97.
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that reflects a new and more aggressive Community environmental policy. For
example, in a resolution accompanying the Programme, the EC Parliament
observed that "a correct environmental policy should aim resolutely to achieve
an economy which takes account of our planet's ecological capacity" and that
"the careful exploitation of natural resources is as important as the factors of
capital and employment. 8 3 The Parliament also noted that "there must
therefore be a profound change in the future Union's economic approach that
takes account of the depletion and impairment of natural resources [and] places
a positive value on the environmental assets of flora, fauna and the ecosystems,
not covered by the market approach."" While the Action Programmes are not
legally binding documents, courts may use them as interpretative tools in
determining the scope of Community legislation, evaluating the consistency of
national law with Community law, and interpreting national law.'5
In addition to these written expressions of the Community's commitment,
the Community's ever-increasing expenditure of resources in the area of
environmental protectiQn further evidences the depth of its concern. The
European Parliament has calculated that ECU 2.3 billion of the Union's 1994
budget is allocated to environmental protection, an amount forty times greater
than the 1988 allocation.8 6 A Community-funded research and development
program for harmonization of measurements and testing, 7 a European
Environment Agency, and a European Environment Monitoring and
Information Network provide other indicia of environmental protection's
important status within the Community hierarchy.
88
C. The Tradeoff Between Environmental Protection and Free Trade
Statements in the "Toward Sustainability" report support the conclusion
that environmental protection should not always be sacrificed when it conflicts
with other important Treaty objectives like the free movement of goods. Such
statements are perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the Community's
increasing commitment to environmental protection and are a notable departure
from the Community's traditional focus on economic integration. They reflect
the Community's movement toward evaluating environmental concerns on the
same level as free trade concerns.8 9 Whereas these statements by Community
83. Id. at 9.
84. Id. at 10.
85. Cf. Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. at 4422 (ruling that national courts must take Community
recommendations into consideration in deciding disputes). See generally SNYDER, supra note 66
(describing-influence of Commission statements).
86. David Wilkinson, supra note 11, at 119.
87. Council Decision 92/247, 1992 O.J. (L 126) 12.
88. Council Regulation 1210/90, art.l(2), 1990 O.J. (L 120) 1, 1-2.
89. The Community's willingness to undertake such balancing notwithstanding its strong need to
eliminate trade barriers is all the more impressive when compared with GATT's treatment of
environmental issues. Although GAIT has been less stringent in eliminating trade barriers, it has also,
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institutions reflect a balancing of economic and environmental concerns,90
only the decisions of the ECJ have transformed this approach into legally
binding norms.
The ECJ has directly addressed the tension between the Community's
trade and environmental objectives in three cases. The cases concern the
compatibility of national environmental protection laws with Community law,
particularly Article 30, in nonharmonized areas.92
The first of those cases, decided in 1985, preceded the express inclusion
of environmental protection as a Community objective in the EEC Treaty.
ADBHU involved a French law transposing a Community directive that
required Member States to pass legislation guaranteeing the safe collection and
disposal of waste oil. The French law went further than the Community
directive in that it prohibited the burning of waste oil except in certain
approved industrial installations,93 whereas the directive simply required that
companies obtain a permit before undertaking any type of waste oil
disposal.94 The French government invoked this law to apply for the
dissolution of an industrial association that burned waste oils on the grounds
that the association's aims and objects were unlawful. In defending against this
action, the association's defense relied on two arguments: (1) the directive was
incompatible with fundamental Community principles such as the free
movement of goods, and (2) the French law was incompatible with the
directive.95
The French court referred these issues to the ECJ,96 which concluded that
paradoxically, been less willing than the Community to recognize environmental concerns as having
equal weight. See, e.g., Mexico v. United States ("Yellow-Fin Tuna Decision"), GAIT Doe. DS21/R,
(Sept. 3, 1991) (holding U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act violative of GATI').
90. See, e.g., 1972 Declaration of Heads of State, supra note 21; Council Resolution, 1993 OJ.
(L 138) 1; Resolution, in FIFTH ACTION PROGRAMME, supra note 1, at 9-10.
91. The trade/environment issue has arisen in other cases, but the ECJ has not addressed it.
Although the ECJ's recent decision in the PCP case is somewhat inconsistent with this prior case law,
PCP does not overrule it because the Court in PCP exclusively addressed the issue of the scope of
Article 100(a)(4) and did not reach the environmental implications of the case. See Case C-41/93, France
v. Commission, 1994 E.C.R. 1829, 1846 [hereinafter PCP]. For an analysis of the PCP holding, see infra
part IY.B.L.(b). German Crayfish is more on point but still does not represent a change in the ECJ's
overall treatment of the trade/environment issue. 1994 E.C.R. at 3303. The German law at issue in that
case effectively prohibited the importation of live crayfish except for research or teaching, in which case
a license was required. Id. at 3316. Although the law aimed at preventing the spread of a crayfish disease
that threatened European crayfish with extinction, the ECJ held that the law violated Article 30 and
failed to meet Article 36's requirement that less restrictive measures be less effective in achieving their
goal. Germany did not make the required showing under Article 36. Id. at 3322-23.
92. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
93. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 547.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The French court referred the questions pursuant to the procedure set forth in Article 177 of
the Treaty, which permits courts of Member States to request ECJ rulings interpreting Community law.
See TEU art. 177.
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the directive was valid and that the French law was compatible with it.97 The
Court declared that the directive must be interpreted from "the perspective of
environmental protection, which is one of the Community's essential
objectives."98 Then, mirroring its language in Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ
concluded that any restriction on trade imposed by the directive was justifiable
insofar as the measure taken is "neither ... discriminatory nor.., beyond the
inevitable restrictions which are justified by the pursuit of the objective of
environmental protection, which is in the general interest."99 The ECJ found
that the French law was consistent with Community law because it furthered
the aim of the waste directive, the "disposal of waste oil in a manner which
is safe for the environment."100
Four years later, after the passage of the SEA, the Danish Bottles case
addressed the question of whether a Danish law requiring all beer and soft
drink containers to be re-usable was consistent with Article 3020' The law
obliged all manufacturers and importers to establish a deposit-and-return
system and to use only containers that had been approved by a certain
government agency.1  The ECJ's analysis began by citing the ADBHU
holding that "the protection of the environment is 'one of the Community's
essential objectives' which may as such justify certain limitations on the
principle of the free movement of goods."'0 3 The ECJ then noted that this
view is "confirmed by the Single European Act."'' 4 Concluding that
environmental protection "is a mandatory requirement which may limit the
application of Article 30 of the Treaty,"105 the Court then turned to whether
the Danish law met the Cassis de Dijon requirement of proportionality. The
ECJ held that the restrictions imposed by the approval system were
disproportionate to the objective pursued because "the Danish authorities [may]
refuse approval to a foreign producer even if he is prepared to ensure that
returned containers are used again. '' 1 6
The Wallonia Waste decision both followed the reasoning in Danish
97. ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 548-52.
98. Id. at 549.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 551. The directive expressly called for the establishment of a permit system. Thus,
Member States still had the power to deny permits where disposal would harm the environment. The ECJ
saw the French law as invoking this option because it only allowed the burning of waste oil at certain
facilities that conformed to environmental protection standards. Id. at 551-52. The Court thereby
implicitly ruled that the directive had not fully harmonized the area.
101. 1989 E.C.R. at 4628. The Danish government brought this case pursuant to Article 169 of the
Treaty. Id.
102. Id. at 4628-29. The law was later amended to allow non-approved containers if they were not
metal and were not "used for quantities exceeding 3000 hectoliters a year per producer," or if they were
used for drinks "sold by foreign producers in order to test the market." Id. at 4629.
103. Id. at 4630.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4631.
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Bottles and went a step further. At issue in Wallonia Waste was the
compatibility with Community law of a regional Belgian law prohibiting the
discharge in Wallonia of waste from outside the region."° Although the ECJ
did find that the Belgian law ran afoul of a Community directive with respect
to the disposal of hazardous waste,08 it concluded that, with respect to waste
not covered by the directive, the law fell within the Cassis de Dijon derogation
from Article 30. This conclusion was surprising because the law clearly
discriminated against imported waste1°9 and therefore failed to meet the
essential requirement in Cassis de Dijon that such laws apply to domestic and
imported products without distinction.
Acknowledging this departure from its previous jurisprudence, the ECJ
explained that the issue of whether the law was discriminatory depended on
the nature of the subject matter in question.110 The Court focused on the
"special characteristic" of waste, the accumulation of which "constitutes a
threat to the environment because of the limited capacity of each region or
locality for receiving it."' . It also relied on Article 130r(2)'s principle that
"environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source' ' 12 and
cited principles from an international hazardous waste convention to which the
Community is a party in order to justify its conclusion that, given the nature
of waste, the law was not discriminatory.'
These three cases demonstrate that, at least with respect to nonharmonized
areas, the Court is often willing to uphold Member States' environmental
protection measures even where such measures restrict intra-Community trade.
The SEA's environmental amendments partially justify this approach. Yet the
ECJ arrived at this result even before enactment of the SEA. Furthermore, the
TEU's amendments to the Treaty of Rome could lead to further developments
in the Community's environmental law jurisprudence. Will the ECJ now be
willing to apply its approach in the ADBHU, Danish Bottles, and Wallonia
Waste cases to harmonized areas, thereby permitting Member States to enforce
stricter environmental standards than the Community?
107. Wallonia Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 4472. As in the Danish Bottles case, the Commission
challenged the national law pursuant to Article 169. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this case, see
Hancher & Sevenster, supra note 42, at 351-67 (providing history and analysis of case). See generally
von Wilmowsky, supra note 42, at 541-70 (describing case and its implications for Community policy).
108. Wallonia Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 4477. The ECJ found that, although the law was consistent
with a Community directive that did not forbid Member States from adopting such prohibitions, it was
incompatible with the other directive, which did not contain specific provisions regarding the
circumstances in which Member States could refuse waste shipments and therefore forbade Member
States from adopting blanket prohibitions like the Belgian law. Id. at 4475-77.
109. See id. at 4479-80.
110. Id. at 4480.
111. Id. at 4479 (translation by author).
112. Id. at 4480.
113. Id.
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IV. COMMUNITY DOCTRINE REGARDING STRICTER NATIONAL STANDARDS
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT
A. The Accepted Wisdom: Once the Community Has Acted, Member States
Cannot Impose More Stringent Regulations
When the Community has not harmonized an area, Member States'
adoption of regulations that burden intra-Community trade is constrained only
by Article 30. If the subject matter falls within Article 36 or meets the
requirements of Cassis de Dijon, the national regulation will be valid under
Community law. 114  When the Community has passed harmonizing
legislation, however, the situation is different. Prior to the adoption of the
SEA, Member States were absolutely precluded from imposing more stringent
requirements in a harmonized area: unless the Community measure expressly
allowed derogations, Member States could only apply the Community
standards. This prohibition applied even to national rules motivated by health
or safety concerns. 
5
The classic statement of this rule appears in the ECJ's decision in the
Ratti case. In Ratti, the Court held that when the Community has issued a
directive under Article 100116 harmonizing a classification (in this case, the
packaging and labeling of chemical solvents), "a Member State may not
introduce into its national legislation conditions which are more restrictive than
those laid down in the directive in question, or which are even more detailed
or in any event different."' 7 Italy's attempt to impose stricter labeling
requirements, despite Community harmonization of this area, was therefore
incompatible with Community law."
8
The ECJ confirmed this holding in subsequent cases by consistently
rejecting the Member States' attempts to impose their own requirements in
areas already subject to Community regulation through harmonization
measures." 9 The rationale of this approach rests on two concerns. First, the
Court feared that any concession to Member States permitting them to set up
regulatory structures parallel to those of the Community would hinder the free
114. For an explanation of these derogations, see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
115. See Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. at 1644.
116. Prior to adoption of the SEA in 1987, Article 100 provided the legal basis for harmonization
measures.
117. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. at 1643.
118. Id. at 1646-47.
119. See, e.g., Case 190/87, Oberkreisdirektr des Kreises Borken v. Handelsondememins
Moormann BV, 1988 E.C.R. 4689, 4719-21 (holding German law requiring inspections of poultry meat
incompatible with Community directive that harmonized procedures for such inspections); Case 28/84,
Commission v. Germany, 1985 E.C.R. 3097 [hereinafter Compound Feedingstuffs] (holding German law
establishing limits for certain substances in compound feedingstuffs incompatible with Community
regulation in same arena); Case 35/76, Simmenthal SpA v. Italian Minister of Finance, 1976 E.C.R.
1871.
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movement of goods within the Community. Second, the ECJ opined that
permitting stricter standards would contribute to legal uncertainty and
undermine the Treaty's division of powers by subverting the authority of
Community institutions (i.e., manufacturers of solvents might choose to comply
with national law rather than Community rules). 12° These twin concerns
prompted the ECJ to prohibit, without exception, stricter national rules; the
rationale for adopting the stricter standards was deemed irrelevant.
B. Reformation of the Accepted Wisdom: Articles 100a(4) and 130t
The SEA created two exceptions to the prohibition against stricter national
rules in harmonized areas. Articles 100a(4) and 130t of the SEA allow
Member States to impose stricter rules when they meet certain requirements.
The introduction of these two "escape routes" represents a significant change
in Community law and demonstrates a willingness to tolerate greater
diversity.
121
The addition of Articles 100a(4) and 130t is analogous to the change in
Article 30 jurisprudence that the ECJ articulated eight years earlier in the
Cassis de Dijon"' decision. As set forth above, that case and its progeny
established that Member States may deviate from Article 30 if they can
demonstrate that their measure is (1) "applicable to domestic and imported
products without distinction," (2) "necessary in order to satisfy mandatory
requirements recognized by Community law," and (3) "proportionate to the
aim in view" because it represents "the means which least restricts the free
movement of goods."" Although the language of Article 100a(4) echoes
these three requirements, the following analysis illustrates that its operational
effects may be different.
1. Article 100a(4)
The Community introduced Article 100a to facilitate completion of the
internal market by 1992. The article promotes this goal by allowing a qualified
majority rather than unanimity for votes on harmonization measures by the
120. The ECJ ruled that Germany could not rely on Article 36 to justify a national measure in an
area subject to complete harmonization. Such a reliance threatened the division of powers under
Community law as well as the free movement of goods. Compound Feedingstuffs, 1985 E.C.R. at 3123.
121. Some commentators have dubbed these exceptions an acceptance of a "variable speed
Europe." E.g., Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 231. One reading of this change is that the Community has
reached a point in its development where allowing more structural flexibility will not undermine
Community authority. Alternatively, the new exceptions may be a response either to growing resentment
among Member States regarding Community authority or to divisions among Member States on issues
such as environmental protection. Both viewpoints are probably at work, forming a backdrop to these
"escape route" articles.
122. 1979 E.C.R. at 9.
123. Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4629.
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Council of Ministers. 1" In exchange for this relaxed voting requirement,
Article 100a contains three significant qualifications. First, it does not apply
to measures relating to fiscal provisions, the free movement of persons, or the
rights and interests of employed persons.125 Second, it requires that
harmonization measures regarding health, safety, and environmental or
consumer protection "take as a base a high level of protection."'' 6 Third, and
most significantly for purposes of this Article, it allows Member States to
impose stricter rules in certain circumstances:
If, after the adoption of a harmonisation measure by the Council acting by a qualified
majority, a Member State deems it necessary to apply national provisions on grounds of
major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection of the environment or the
working environment, it shall notify the Commission of these provisions.
The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after having verified that they are not
a means of arbitrary discrinination or a disguised restriction on trade between member States.'7
Article 100a(4) thus departs from the rule established in Ratti that Member
States may not derogate from Community law in harmonized areas.
Significantly, Article 100a(4) singles out environmental protection as one of
the areas where derogation is allowed. This express inclusion was urged by
Germany and Denmark, which feared they would be forced to lower their
environmental standards as a result of Community harmonization
measures.12
a. Debates Surrounding the Scope of Article lOOa(4)
Several disputes have arisen concerning Article 100a(4). The following
discussion examines these debates according to the order in which the relevant
language appears in the provision.
The first debate' concerns whether a Member State must have
unsuccessfully opposed the measure from which it seeks to deviate in the
Council in order to rely later on Article 100a(4)'s derogation procedure.
Although at least one commentator supports this view, arguing that the
provision is a tradeoff for allowing measures based on a qualified majority
124. The Maastricht Treaty subsequently amended Article 100a, replacing qualified majority voting
with Article 189b's "co-decision procedure." See infra note 175.
125. TEU art. 100a, para. 2.
126. Id. art. 100a, para. 3.
127. Id. art. 100a, para. 4 (emphasis added).
128. JEAN-VICrOR DE RuYT, L'ACrE UNIQUE EUROPEEN 172 (2nd ed. 1989). De Ruyt also points
out that Article 100a(4) fills the role formerly played by the Luxembourg Compromise because it gives
Member States an avenue for protecting their "vital interests." Unlike the Luxembourg Compromise,
however, it does not permit a Member State to block a vote by invoking such interests. Id. at 175. The
Compromise was an agreement among the Member States to try, "within a reasonable time," to obtain
unanimous support for any proposed Community action, otherwise subject to qualified majority voting,
that affected a State's "vital interest." WYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 46.
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vote, 129 the more accepted opinion is that such opposition is not required.
This latter view relies on the absence of an opposition requirement in the text
of the article. Furthermore, it recognizes that the former interpretation would
hinder passage of harmonization measures because Member States would be
required to oppose any legislation where they anticipated reliance on Article
100a(4).a°
The second debate centers on whether a subjective or objective perspective
should govern the necessity requirement. The wording of the article appears
to support a subjective test - a Member State's determination that a measure
is necessary is sufficient. However, the ECJ implicitly rejected this view in its
PCP decision and instead required the Commission to conduct a thorough
review of the legal and factual circumstances before confirming the
measure.131 The Advocate General goes even further, suggesting that the
burden of proof for demonstrating necessity should lie with the Member
State.
1 32
The third debate concerns whether the word "apply" in Article 100a(4)
allows a Member State to introduce a new national law or merely permits
enforcement of an already existing measure. Again, the article's language does
not limit Member States to already existing measures.133 A comparison with
the language used in Article 130t, which specifically employs the phrase
"maintaining or introducing," nonetheless suggests another view.'34 Relying
on this difference, some commentators 135 have argued that Article 100a(4)
only covers existing measures.136 In light of the Community's expressed
129. DE RuYT, supra note 128, at 171, 174.
130. WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 365; see also Han Somsen, Applying More
Protective National Environmental Laws after Harmonization, 3 EuR. ENvTiL. L. REv. 238, 241 (1994)
(noting that it would "defy common sense" to require Member States to oppose Community
environmental measures in circumstances where doing so would harm both environment and common
market).
131. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1850.
132. Id. at 1834 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro). This opinion is discussed in more detail
in Part IV.B.I. The Advocate General's role is to provide a nonpartisan analysis of the issues to assist
the Court. TEU art. 166.
133. See DE RuYT, supra note 128, at 171; WYATT & DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 365.
134. See infra part IV.B.2.
135. See, e.g., KRAmER, supra note 5, at 27. Mr. Kramer is Head of Legal Matters and Community
Law at the Commission's Directorate General responsible for environmental affairs.
136. See PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1832 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro); KRAimR, supra note
19, at 338-39; Ludwig Kramer, Environmental Protection andArticle 30 EEC Treaty, 30 CoMMON MKT.
L. REV. 111, 113 & n.11 (1993); see also Somsen, supra note 130, at 241-42 (characterizing ECJ
holding in PCP as stating that Article 100a(4) applies only to existing measures); Wilkinson, supra note
16, at 223 (characterizing this argument as more "widely-accepted view"). From a policy standpoint,
allowing Member States to enact more stringent laws after Community law is passed might constitute
a greater threat to the supremacy of Community law than permitting Member States to pass more
stringent laws before Community law is enacted. National legislators could then effectively overrule
Community law. In contrast, by pressuring Member States to pass the stricter measures before the
passage of the Community legislation, this approach might ultimately help influence the passage of
stricter measures on a Community level.
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commitment to a high level of environmental protection, resolving ambiguity
with respect to environmental matters should allow Member States to pass
stricter legislation even after Community measures are in place.
The fourth debate relates to the level of review the Commission should
impose on national measures before confirning them. According to a
declaration it annexed to the SEA, Denmark views the notification requirement
as a mere formality. 137 Under this interpretation, if a measure passes Article
100a's nondiscriminatory/non-arbitrary threshold, the Commission must
confirm it.138 Yet most commentators believe such a result would be contrary
to the supremacy of Community law because it would resolve the conflict
between Community ,law and national law in favor of the latter without the
intervention of any Community institution.'39 The ECJ's PCP decision
reflects this same belief in that the Court required the Commission to
thoroughly explain its reasons for determining that the requirements of Article
100a had been met.14'
A final debate concerns whether a Member State may enforce its law after
notification to the Commission but before the Commission has issued its
confirmation. 41 This issue holds particular importance when a delay occurs
in the Commission's review of the measure, as in the PCP case. In that
situation, sixteen months passed between Germany's notification of its intent
to rely on Article 100a(4) and the Commission's decision to confirm the
reliance. Moreover, the confirmation came five months after the deadline for
transposition of the measure. 42 If such delays could prevent Member State
enforcement of the national law in question, they would significantly restrict
or possibly eliminate the derogation provided by Article 100a(4). A more
rational solution would be to allow the provisional application of such laws
until the Commission has come to a decision, but the ECJ did not opt for this
137. The Danish Government notes that in cases where a Member State is of the opinion that
measures adopted under Article 100A do not safeguard'higher requirements concerning the working
environment, the protection of the environment, or the needs referred to in Article 36, the provisions of
Article 100 A(4) guarantee that the Member State in question can apply national provisions. Such
national provisions fulfill the aforementioned aim and may not entail hidden protectionism. Declaration
by the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on Article 100A (emphasis added); see also DE RUYT,
supra note 128, at 173 (noting the Danish declaration).
138. The nonbinding nature of such declarations, however, means that Denmark would not
necessarily be exempted from the notification requirement.
139. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1835 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro); see also WYATr &
DASHWOOD, supra note 22, at 366 (discussing quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent
effect).
140. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1841.
141. A related issue concerns the timing of notification. See Somsen, supra note 130, at 242.
142. The Commission not only delayed in its decision, but also allowed almost four months to
expire before informing Germany that it had received the notification. See PCP Communication, supra
note 77, at 2-4; see also PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1835 n.8 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro)
(commenting on passage of time and suggesting that this should not work to disadvantage of Member
State). The Advocate General's position here seems ambiguous and somewhat contradictory in light of
his disapproval of the notion that confirmation is more than a formality.
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solution in its PCP decision. Instead, the Court mandated Commission
approval before Member States could enforce their stricter measures. 43
b. The First Decision Regarding the Scope of Article 100a(4): The PCP
Case
Member States have rarely relied on Article 100a(4). They have made
notifications under it only twice since its introduction in 1987: once in 1987
with respect to restrictions on vehicle emissions, and again in 1991 with
respect to the marketing and use of the chemical pentachlorophenol
("PCP")."44 Only the latter case reached the stage of formal confirmation by
the Commission. France appealed the Commission's decision to the ECJ,
thereby affording the Court its first, and to date only, opportunity to interpret
the scope of Article 100a(4).' 45
The PCP case involved a Community directive that severely restricted the
use of PCP and a more stringent German law that effectively banned the
chemical, which is dangerous to humans and the environment. 46 In 1989,
Germany outlawed concentrations of PCP in manufactured goods exceeding
0.01% of the total composition of the product. Two years later, the Council
voted by qualified majority (with Germany opposing) to modify the existing
Community directive regulating PCP usage to permit a maximum concentration
of 0.1%. The new Community measure established a July 1992 deadline for
transposing the directive. In August 1991, Germany notified the Commission
that it intended to rely on Article 100a(4) and maintain its banning
regulation) 47
When the Commission sent the notification request to the Member States
for their opinions, Greece and Belgium maintained that the level imposed by
the Community was appropriate and that the German measure would hinder
intra-Community trade. Italy agreed, arguing further that Germany's ban would
adversely affect imports of Italian leather with no offsetting environmental
benefit. France claimed that Germany had not adequately justified the measure,
which would lead to serious trade losses both within the Community and with
other nations. Only Denmark supported the measure148 In spite of the
opposition, the Commission confirmed the request, and France brought an
143. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1849; see also Somsen, supra note 130, at 242 (suggesting that
imposition of this '"standstill obligation'... may mean that this part of Article 100a(4) is directly
effective").
144. The policies of Germany were at issue in both of these cases.
145. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1831 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro). France based its action
on Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome, which grants the ECJ jurisdiction to hear a Member State's
challenge to a Commission decision.
146. PCP is used principally as a wood preservative. Krfmer, supra note 136, at 125.
147. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1831-32 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro).
148. PCP Communication, supra note 77, at 5.
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action challenging the Commission's decision. '49
Because Germany did oppose the Community's modification of the PCP
regulation in the Council, and because the German legislation was already in
place when the Community legislation came into force, the PCP case does not
directly address the first and third debates about Article 100a(4).,5° Yet, it
squarely raises the other debates-and has given both the Commission and the
ECJ an opportunity to comment on the scope of Article 100a(4).
In its first of two decisions in this case, the Commission noted that the
Community enacted Article 100a(4) to ensure that, when a harmonizing
measure is passed, Member States will not be obliged to lower their standards
of protection in areas such as the environment.'51 In light of this observation,
the Commission concluded that (1) like other exceptions to the uniform
application of Community law, this derogation must be interpreted strictly; (2)
the German PCP ban was more stringent than the Community directive; (3)
PCP was known to be a dangerous chemical; (4) the "major needs"
requirement of Article 36 justified the German law; (5) by the terms of the
directive, the Community must reconsider the restrictions on PCP in three
years; and (6) while the German ban constituted a trade barrier, the measure
was not disproportionate to the interest the derogation sought to protect and did
not constitute arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on intra-
Community trade.
1 52
These findings demonstrate that the Commission does not view
confirmation or denial of a Member State's request as purely formal. Yet
although the Commission insisted that the article be strictly interpreted, the
tests in this initial decision were not onerous. In particular, the Commission
did not seem to have considered, in finding that the German law was not
disproportionate to the ends it envisaged, whether other means might have
afforded the same- level of.protection'while impinging less on trade. The
Commission also apparently did not consider whether the German standard of
0.01% would afford environmental benefits that the Community limit of 0.1%
did not. Its evaluation implicitly took the view that if a Member State makes
a prima facie case that its law aims at environmental protection, the
Commission will confirm its request to derogate from a lower Community
standard. While the Commission did not discuss its philosophy concerning
Article 100a(4), its analysis suggests that its chief concern was giving effect
149. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1831-32 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro). Significant economic
and political factors may have been at work as well. The Dutch Association for Nature and the
Environment, arguing in support of a community-wide ban on PCP, implied that domestic and economic
concerns motivated France's challenge to the Commission's decision. The French company Rh~ne-
Poulenc is the principal European importer of PCP. See Alain Franco, Une association nierlandaise
lance une campagne contre le pentachorophdnol, LE MoNDE, July 6, 1994, at 9.
150. For an explanation of the debates, see supra part IV.B.I.a.
151. See PCP Communication, supra note 77, at 8.
152. Id. at 5-7.
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to the environmental policies underlying the article.
Advocate General Tesauro read Article 100a(4) in a way much less
favorable to the Member State invoking it. Like the Commission, he insisted
that the article be strictly interpreted; 153 unlike the Commission in its first
decision, however, he applied this principle. He stressed that the Commission's
role in reviewing a Member State's application pursuant to this article is
fundamental, and not purely formal, because only through obtaining the
Commission's confirmation can the Member State be authorized to derogate
from the harmonized regulation." Accordingly, Advocate General Tesauro
argued that when it reviews a national law for compliance with Article
100a(4), the Commission should apply the same test mandated under Article
36: the measure must be both necessary and proportional. 155 According to
Tesauro, this standard is hard to meet. The Member State must not only bear
the burden of proof on these points, but must also show that no alternative
measure exists that would achieve the end at a lesser cost to the free
circulation of goods.156 He thus concurred with France that Germany
demonstrated neither the necessity nor the proportionality of its law, and he
found that the Commission had provided inadequate reasons for its
decision.157 In the Advocate General's view, the Commission must do more
than acknowledge that a national law imposes stricter standards; it must further
state why the stricter standards are both necessary and proportional.5 8
The ECJ did not reach the issue of whether the German law met the
requirements of Article 100a(4) because it, like the Advocate General,
concluded that the Commission had not given adequate reasons. While it did
not address the case on the merits, the Court did provide an interpretation of
Article 100a(4) to the extent needed to resolve this procedural question. The
Court began by examining the structure of the Treaty of Rome itself. This
structure, the ECJ emphasized, aims-to create a common market through the
elimination of obstacles to intra-Community trade. 159 Accordingly, Article
100a(4) permits. derogation from this- fundamental goal only when the
Commission finds that the conditions set forth in the article are met. 60 The
Court seemed to assume that only existing laws may benefit from this
derogation' 6 1 and stated specifically that the Member State may not enforce
153. PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1833 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro).
154. Id. The Advocate General thus seems to be implying, contrary to the interpretation of the
Commission's decision offered above, that the Commission's review of the German law was purely
formal.
155. Id. at 1834.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1836.
158. Id. at 1838.
159. Id. at 1841, 1847.
160. Id. at 1848.
161. Id. (noting that existing laws may benefit "where... a Member State intends, as in this case,
to continue to apply national provisions derogating from the measure") (emphasis added).
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its law without the Commission's approval. ' 62 The Commission should not
give such approval, moreover, before it thoroughly analyzes the national law
and the rationale for derogation. Thus, the ECJ held that the Commission erred
in determining that the German regulation complied with the requirements of
Article 100a(4) without explaining why, in law and fact, it had met these
requirements. 163 The ECJ consequently annulled the Commission's decision.
The Commission responded to the ECJ's decision by issuing another of
its own that analyzed in detail the uses of PCP and the types of health hazards
associated with it."6 The Commission explained that PCP presented a
"special health problem for Germany because of its past as a major producer
and user of this substance," thereby posing hazards to both humans and the
aquatic environment. 65 The Commission observed further that the German
measure applied equally to domestic and nondomestic products containing PCP
and hence did not represent a disguised restriction on trade between the
Member States. Germany had no "special interest in the development,
production of [sic] exportation of substitutes for PCP," and there was little
trade in PCP-containing products between Germany and the other Member
States. 1 66 Based on these factors, the Commission concluded that the measure
met the requirements of Article 100a(4). Because neither France nor any other
Member State challenged this decision within the requisite time period, 67 the
German measure may now be enforced.
The Court's approach in the PCP case is noteworthy precisely because it
is not novel. Although PCP was the first case involving Article 100a(4) and
presented the highly topical issue of how to balance free trade with concern
for the environment, the ECJ chose to avoid addressing this issue and opted
instead for a strictly procedural approach. Such an approach is not entirely
surprising given that this was the first Article 1 00a(4) case and that the
Commission decision was quite brief. An ECJ decision based on the
Commission's second, more detailed opinion would give a better sense of how
the Court views this derogating provision and how likely it would be to uphold
Member State reliance on the article. Nevertheless, even given the limited
scope of its opinion, the ECJ has provided some insight into its general
approach to Article 100a(4). The Court's decision not to mention the express
inclusion of the phrase "environmental protection" in Article 100a(4) or other
Treaty language that underscores the Community's commitment to
162. Id. at 1849. The Court's summary of the facts of the case noted that Germany had voted
against the directive in the Council. Arguably, this observation is evidence that the ECJ requires such
action before a Member State may rely on Article 100a. Id. at 1845.
163. Id. at 1850.
164. Commission Decision of 14 September 1994 Concerning the Prohibition of PCP Notified by
the Federal Republic of Germany, 1994 OJ. (L 316) 43, 44-45.
165. Id. at 45.
166. Id. at 47-48.
167. France (or any other Member State) had two months after publication of the decision to bring
another action before the Court. See TEU art. 173.
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environmental protection (or its own jurisprudence to that effect) and instead
to focus on free trade concerns is significant. Rather than recognizing that the
type of legislation in the PCP case represents a vastly different situation from
conflicts over trade, the ECJ apparently treated the case like yet another
garden-variety conflict over the free movement of goods. 6' From this
perspective, the Court had no trouble deciding that Article 100a(4), like other
derogating provisions, requires strict interpretation.
At the very least, the Court's PCP decision represents a missed
opportunity: a chance for the ECJ to instruct the Commission and the national
courts on how to balance the competing objectives of free trade and
environmental protection. While the Commission's second decision does
provide such instruction, the ECJ may not adopt the same approach.
Furthermore, to the extent that the PCP decision may represent how the Court
would weigh the competing ideals of free trade and environmental protection
in harmonized areas, the decision is troubling.
The PCP opinion appears to be a step backward from the ECJ's decisions
in ADBHU, Danish Bottles, and Wallonia Waste. In those cases, the Court
resolved conflicts between protecting the environment and preserving free trade
in favor of the environment. The PCP decision moves in the other direction,
subordinating the Community's environmental objectives to the preservation
of free trade. Indeed, the primary concern of both the ECJ and the Advocate
General was to ensure free trade within the Community.
169
The balance implicitly struck between trade and environment would curtail
a Member State's ability to pursue on its own initiative the goals that the
Community has committed itself to accomplish both internally and
internationally. Furthermore, the very exercise of balancing these two
competing objectives is unnecessary, and perhaps even unwarranted, because
the Community has already established this balance by creating Article
100a(4). The tradeoff for allowing Community measures adopted by qualified
majority voting to impose lower environmental standards was that Member
States would have the possibility to "opt out" of the harmonization program.
Consequently, if a Member State meets the requirements of Article 100a(4),
no further balancing of environmental and trade objectives is necessary.
While the PCP case is one of the few instances in which a Member State
has relied on Article 100a(4), it is not likely to be the last. New Member
States whose existing environmental legislation is stricter than the
Community's standards have acceded to the Community.170 The EEA has
come into being and includes states that value high levels of environmental
protection; Community law will apply to these states as well.'71 The stage
168. Instead, the German law may impose a competitive disadvantage on German manufacturers
by requiring them to find replacements for PCP in their products.
169. See PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1847-48; id. at 1834 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro).
170. See Hoyer, supra note 12, at 3.
171. Id. at 2-3.
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is thus set for the regular invocation of Article 100a(4). If attempts to rely on
Article 100a(4) are questioned, the ECJ may have occasion to revisit its
decision in the PCP case, this time addressing the underlying issue of whether
the German measure meets the requirements of Article 100a(4). At the very
least, the Commission and national courts now face the tasks of applying the
PCP decision in other cases and resolving the questions that it leaves
unanswered.
2. Article 130t
Article 130t provides the other route for enforcement of more stringent
national laws. It appears in Title XVI, which the SEA added to the Treaty of
Rome specifically to address environmental issues. Article 130t provides the
Community with its first explicit legal basis for actions to protect the
environment. As modified by the Maastricht Treaty, Article 130t states that
"[t]he protective measures adopted in common pursuant to Article 130s shall
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more stringent
protective measures compatible with this Treaty. Such measures must be
compatible with this Treaty. They shall be notified to the Commission."
172
Although the TEU's imposition of the notice requirement made Article 130t
more consistent with Article 100a(4), Article 130t provides Member States
with greater room to enforce their national laws than Article 100a(4). Under
Article 130t, Member States may not only maintain existing national laws, but
they may also introduce new laws - a right they might not enjoy under
Article 100a(4). In addition, unlike Article 100a(4), Article 130t does not
require that the Commission approve the measure; it only requires that the
Member State notify the Commission.173 Finally, because Article 130t does
not mention Article 36, Advocate General Tesauro's argument in the PCP
case, that the Article 36 requirement of necessity would apply, lacks force.
The ECJ has not yet addressed these issues. Article 130 cases have
concerned only the question of proper legal basis, whether Article 130s should
serve as the legal basis for a particular directive rather than some other article
such as Article 100a.174 The legal basis affects Member States' ability to
enforce stricter standards because, although Article 130t imposes an easier
standard than Article 100a(4), a Member State can invoke Article 130t only if
172. TEU art. 130t (emphasis in original). Article 130s describes the legislative procedures that
the institutions must follow when pursuing the environmental protection objectives outlined in Article
130r. TEU art. 130s.
173. The ECJ may very well decide, however, that Commission review is implicit in such a
notification requirement. At any rate, the Commission could always challenge such a measure under
Article 169.
174. See, e.g., Case C-155191, Commission v. Council, 1993 E.C.R. 963,964-69 [hereinafter Waste
Directive]; Case C-300/89, Commission (Parliament Intervening) v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 2867
[hereinafter Titanium Dioxide].
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the relevant Community measure is based on Article 130s.
Article 130s cases involving proper legal basis arose because, under the
SEA, the legislative procedures differed significantly for Article 130s and
Article 100a measures. 175 The difference in these procedures prompted
disputes between the Council, which favored the use of Article 130s, and the
Commission and European Parliament, which favored the use of Article 100a
because voting under Article 100a was by qualified majority and Parliament
had a greater role in the legislative process.1 76 Although these decisions do
not specify which national laws benefit from the derogation permitted by
Article 130t, they do indicate what type of Community legislation should rest
on Article 130s rather than on Article 100a.
The ECJ recently addressed the issue of legal basis in the Waste Directive
case. 17 7 In that case, the Council based a waste directive on Article 130s and
the Commission filed an application for annulment on the grounds that the
Council should have based it on Article 100a.1 78 The Court rejected the
Commission's application after determining that the directive's principal
objective was environmental protection.1 79 While acknowledging that some
provisions of the directive did "have an impact on the functioning of the
internal market,"' 0 the ECJ held that
the sole fact that the establishment or the functioning of the internal market is concerned is
not sufficient for article 100a EEC to apply. Indeed, as th[is] court has consistently held, the
legal basis of article 100a is not justified where harmonization of the conditions of the
market within the community are only ancillary to the act to be adopted.' 8'
Because Article 130t requires less than Article 100a, Member States who
175. Under the SEA, 130s measures required a unanimous vote by the Council "on a proposal from
the Commission after consultation with the European Parliament and the Economic and Social
Committee." SEA art. 25. Conversely, 100a measures required qualified majority voting by the Council
"on a proposal from the Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament and after consultation
with the Economic and Social Committee." SEA art. 18. The TEU retains this difference in voting
procedures, albeit to a much lesser extent. Most 130s measures are now subject to the procedures
described in Article 189c (the "cooperation" procedure), although some still require unanimity and others
are subject to the procedures described in Article 189b (the "co-decision" procedure). Article 189b
procedures govem all 100a measures. While 189b and 189c procedures differ slightly, both give
Parliament a greater role in drafting legislation than the consultation procedure does. TEU arts. 130s,
189b, 189c.
176. This preference for different legal bases with their different voting requirements reflects the
power struggle among the Council, Commission, and Parliament in creating Community legislation. The
differing preferences also reflect the orientations of the institutions, as the more nationalist Council
prefers unanimous voting (which preserves Member States' veto power), while the more supra-
nationalist Commission prefers qualified majority voting (which eliminates veto power)-
177. 1993 E.C.R. at 963. The ECJ recently confirmed this result in Case C-187/93, Parliament v.
Council, 1994 E.C.R. 2857, 2882.
178. Waste Directive, 1993 E.C.R. at 965.
179. Id. at 968-69.
180. Id. at 968 (translation by author).
181. Id. (translation by author).
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seek to enforce more stringent environmental measures should pressure the
Commission and Council to base relevant Community legislation on Article
130s.182 Taking a cue from the ECJ's decision in the Waste Directive case,
Member States should argue that Article 130s is the appropriate legal basis
when environmental protection is the "principal objective" of the
legislation. 3 Moreover, because the voting requirements of these two
articles are more similar under the TEU, the choice of legal basis matters less
to the balance of power among Community institutions. The Commission and
the European Parliament will therefore have less reason to oppose this choice
of legal basis."l
C. A Different Reformation: Cases Finding No Harmonization, Thereby
Allowing Higher Standards'
Alternatively, a Member State may maintain its stricter environmental
standards by persuading the national court considering the issue or the ECJ that
Community legislation has not harmonized the area covered by the national
legislation. In this way, the Member State could avoid the issue of whether it
has met the requirements of Articles 100a(4) or 130t and instead need only
prove that it has met the Cassis de Dijon requirements for derogating from
Article 30. This possibility exists because virtually no Community legislation
explicitly states, "This enactment harmonizes area X." Instead, Member States
and courts usually are responsible for determining whether the legislation has
left any space for national legislation. When determining the scope of
legislation, they must look to its legal basis, its language, its objectives, and
the comprehensiveness of its rules."8 5 Resolution of this question of scope
is often difficult, however, and creates an opportunity for result-oriented
approaches.
182. This difference and the incentive it creates may mean that the ECJ will adopt a similar
interpretation of both provisions.
183. In the case of existing Article 100a legislation, the Member State might consider arguing that
the legislation is invalid because it should have been based on Article 130t. However, the novelty of
such an argument in this context and the vagueness of the "principle objective" test cast doubt upon the
likely success of this tactic. An analogous argument appears in Case C-62/88, Greece v. Council, 1990
E.C.R. 1545, 1547-51, in which Greece unsuccessfully argued that Article 130s, and not Article 113, was
the proper legal basis for a measure establishing the maximum allowable level of radioactive
contamination for agricultural products coming from third countries.
184. Indeed, the European Parliament, in its traditional role as champion of high environmental
standards within the Community, may be more willing to promote the use of Article 130t if it believes
that a higher level of environmental protection will result. See Judge, supra note 52, at 209-10.
185. American courts analyze preemption questions similarly. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 78-79 (1941) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("Every Act of Congress occupies some field, but we must
know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state from the exercise of
any power reserved to it by the Constitution. To discover the boundaries we look to the federal statute
itself, read in the light of its constitutional setting and its legislative history.").
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The ECJ's decision in the Enichem case exemplifies such an
approach.186 In that case, the Court addressed the scope of harmonization
imposed by a Community waste disposal directive. The applicants, producers
of plastic containers, wrappings, and bags, challenged a decision by the mayor
of the municipality prohibiting the sale or use of plastic bags and other
nonbiodegradable containers.'" The applicants argued that the directive had
harmonized the area, precluding the municipality from enforcing its law.
188
However, the ECJ rejected that argument and found instead that the national
law did not encroach on any Community competence because it concerned the
sale and use of plastic bags, not waste disposal.
189
The Enichem court noted that the Community directive did not prohibit
Member States "from imposing such prohibitions in order to protect the
environment," and that "any different interpretation would conflict with its
objectives."' 9 This condition revealed that "the directive is intended inter
alia to encourage national measures likely to prevent the production of waste.
Limitation or prohibition of the sale or use of products such as non-
biodegradable containers is conducive to the attainment of that objective."'191
Adopting this "purpose-oriented" approach permitted the Court to read the
directive narrowly and uphold the stricter national law.
The ECJ was nevertheless unwilling to apply its Enichem approach one
year later in the Scottish Grouse case.1 92 It concluded that a Community
directive aimed at protecting wild birds had harmonized the area and prevented
the Netherlands from enforcing a law prohibiting the sale of wild birds even
though, as in Enichem, the stricter national law had the same underlying
purpose as the directive. Yet the ECJ based its finding on the fact that the
directive protected only migratory species and endangered birds while the bird
in question, the red grouse, was "neither a migratory species nor a seriously
endangered species."' 93 The Dutch law therefore did not fall within the
directive's safeguard provision allowing Member States to adopt stricter
measures.1" Consequently, one interpretation of Scottish Grouse is not that
the Court has modified the approach it used in Enichem, but rather that the
specific facts in the later case constrained its interpretation of the Community
legislation.
The ECJ could have clarified its approach on these issues in Regina v.
London Boroughs Transport Committee exparte Freight Transport Association
186. Case 380/87, Enichem Base v. Comune di Cinisello Balsano, 1989 E.C.R. 2491.
187. Id. at 2513.
188. Id. at 2513-14.
189. Id. at 2515.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Case C-169/89, Criminal Proceedings Against Gourmetterie Van den Burg, 1990 E.C.R. 2143
[hereinafter Scottish Grouse].
193. Id. at 2164.
194. Id. at 2163-64.
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Ltd.1 95 Unfortunately, the case never reached the Court because the House
of Lords denied the request for an Article 177 reference on the grounds of the
acte claire doctrine. 96 London Boroughs Transport involved a challenge to
a noise control ordinance issued by the London transport authorities that
banned the nighttime circulation of heavy-goods vehicles in residential London
streets. Only vehicles equipped with an air brake noise suppressor were
exempt. A haulers' association brought the action based in part on Community
law, arguing that the ordinance's imposition of a noise suppressor requirement
violated Community directive 71/320 on vehicle brakes' 97 and directive
70/157 on sound levels.1
98
While the haulers' association succeeded in the Divisional Court199 and
Court of Appeals,' the House of Lords rejected this argument.2" 1 Unlike
the lower courts, the House of Lords concluded that the Community had not
harmonized the area covered by the London noise ordinance. Lord Templeman
explained that the brake directive harmonized only the technical and safety
requirements for brakes, not their sound level, while the sound level directive
harmonized sound levels for vehicles and exhaust systems, but not for air
brakes. Moreover, the local noise ordinance aimed to protect the environment
and to regulate traffic rather than vehicles." Lord Templeman reached this
result after reviewing Articles 100 and 130r(4) and concluded that
[t]he attainment of the Community object of preserving, protecting and improving the quality
of the environment requires action at the level of individual member-States. A vehicle which
complies with all the weight, size, sound level and other technical requirements and
standards of directives issued by the Council pursuant to Article 100 and is therefore entitled
to be used in every member-State throughout the Community is not thereby entitled to be
driven on every road, on every day, at every hour throughout the Community.
He also cited data on noise pollution from the Commission's Green Paper on
195. House of Lords, U.K., 1 C.M.L.R. 5 (1992).
196. For an explanation of the acte claire doctrine, see Case 283/81, Srl C.I.L.F.I.T. & Lanificio
di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 3435-37 [hereinafter CJ.L.FJ.T.] (Opinion
of Advocate General Capotorti). In that case, the ECJ interpreted paragraph three of Article 177, which
states that Member States' courts of last resort "shall" refer questions of Community law to the ECJ,
see TEU art. 177. The Court in CJ.L.FJ.T. read this provision as imposing no duty to refer when "the
correct application of Community law may be so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt
as to the manner in which the question raised is to be resolved." 1982 E.C.R. at 3430.
197. Council Directive 71/320, 1971 O.J. (L 202) 37, 37.
198. Council Directive 70/157, 1970 O.J. (L 42) 16, 16.
199. Regina v. London Boroughs Transp. Comm. exparte Freight Transp. Ass'n Ltd., 1 C.M.L.R.
229 (Q.B. Div'l Court 1990) (U.K.).
200. Regina v. London Boroughs Transp. Comm. exparte Freight Transp. Ass'n Ltd., 3 C.M.L.R.
495 (C.A. 1990) (U.K.).
201. 1 C.M.L.R. at 5 (1992).
202. Id. at 14-15.
203. Id. at 16. Judge Kr~mer has drawn a similar distinction between Community competence for
setting technical standards and Member State competence for regulating the use of goods meeting those
standards. Kr~imer, supra note 136, at 114.
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The Urban Environment' and determined that the data supported the
London noise ordinance, which he held to be consistent with Article 130r.205
Lord Templeman's rejection of the applicant's request for an Article 177
reference was consistent with his resolution of the harmonization question:
Since the Court of Appeal did not appreciate the fundamental distinction between the control
of vehicles and the regulation of local traffic I do not attach significance to their decision
on Community law. In my opinion it is clear that the Order of 1985 and condition 11 [the
London ordinance] are concerned solely with the regulation of local traffic. No plausible
grounds have been advanced for a reference to the European Court of Justice.2
While Lord Templeman's approach to the harmonization issue is a
questionable application of the, acte claire doctrine, 7 it does implicitly
create another means for allowing stricter national laws. This approach differs
from the derogations provided by Articles 100a(4) and 130t in that it depends
on a finding that the area in question has not been harmonized. Thus,
analytically it belongs within the framework of Articles 30 and 36 and Cassis
de Dijon. Indeed, the measure still must be analyzed under that framework
even after a finding of no harmonization has been made. Nevertheless,
provided that the measure meets the requirements of either Article 36 or Cassis
de Dijon, the effect of this approach is somewhat similar to that of Articles
100a(4) and 130t because it allows the stricter national law to remain in force.
V. THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT FOR PERMITTING HIGHER NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
As set forth above, the Community's commitment to environmental
protection has led it to amend the Treaty of Rome, adopt environmental
protection measures, and, on most occasions, interpret Community law in a
way that furthers this commitment. Authorizing Member States to impose
stricter environmental standards is-not only consistent with this commitment,
but also crucial to its attainment. Several reasons support this conclusion. First,
higher standards will improve environmental protection in Member States that
opt for them. Next, the availability of this derogation mechanism should make
passage of Community environmental measures easier by minimizing
opposition from States that support stricter measures, and therefore should
204. Communication from the Commission to the Council and Parliament: Green Paper on the
Urban Environment, COM(90)218. This paper reports on problems faced in urban areas throughout the
Community, including noise and air pollution, and suggests various solutions.
205. 1 C.M.L.R. at 16-19 (1992).
206. Id. at 21.
207. The application is questionable because the doctrine is meant to apply only when resolution
of the Community law question is "so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt."
CJL.FJ.T., 1982 E.C.R. at 3430. Moreover, the ECJ stressed that before the national court reaches this
determination it must be convinced that the matter would be equally obvious to the courts of the other
Member States and the ECJ. Id. /
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improve protection on a Community level. Finally, States that have imposed
stricter measures may indirectly contribute to the adoption of higher standards
on a Community-wide basis by facilitating the compilation of statistics about
the costs and benefits of such measures and by providing an example of a
feasible level of protection. In this manner, the Community can eventually
adopt standards originating on the national level and thereby maximize
environmental protection in the long run.
This approach is consistent with the objectives set forth in Article 130r(l)
because it protects the quality of the environment and human health at an even
higher standard than the Community and therefore reflects a more "prudent and
rational utilization of natural resources. ' 2°s It also fulfills the Community's
goal of "aim[ing] at a high level of protection" while still "taking into account
the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community.
29
Moreover, national measures that impose more stringent environmental
standards would represent a valid application of the precautionary principle and
could constitute application of the "rectification of pollution at source" or
"polluter pays" principles.
The principles of subsidiarity and shared responsibility, which the TEU
emphasizes, also support stricter national laws. The environment is an area in
which the Community shares its competence with Member States. Based on
the subsidiarity principle, however, Community action is limited to areas in
which the Member States cannot sufficiently achieve the proposed action.
Environmental action constitutes such an area, which "by reason of the scale
or effects of the proposed action [is] better achieved by the community."10
This structure contemplates action on both the Member State and Community
levels, depending on which would be more effective. When combined with the
Community's environmental objectives, application of this principle of stricter
national laws should maximize environmental protection by promoting the
most comprehensive and effective regulation of the environment.2" '
The primary objection to permitting Member States to enforce their stricter
208. TEU art. 130r(1).
209. TEU art. 130r(2). The contrary argument is that this provision is meant to ensure Community
rather than Member State action at the highest level. However, this argument ignores the fact that the
provision employs the phrase "Community policy," a phrase that incorporates actions on both a
Community and Member State level, and not "Community legislation" or "Community action," which
would denote action only on the Community level. Consequently, the response to the argument is that
permitting Member States to enforce their stricter standards is part of "Community policy" and hence
complies with Article 130.
210. TEU art. 3b.
211. See Kramer, supra note 136, at 114-15, 142-43; cf. Colin Hines, The Green View on
Subsidiarity, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 15 (arguing that '[gireen subsidiarity' would be defined as
confining EC intervention to those areas where it will be more effective than national action in ensuring
maximum protection of the environmene'). See generally Koen Lenaerts, The Principle of Subsidiarity
and the Environment in the European Union: Keeping the Balance of Federalism, 17 FORDHAM INT'L




standards on a national level is concern that these standards would conflict
with the fundamental principle of the free movement of goods. 212 The only
response to this objection is to acknowledge that allowing Member States to
enforce stricter environmental measures would indeed necessarily affect free
trade in the Community. Accepting such an approach therefore means
accepting environmental protection as an "essential objective" of the
Community, an objective that will, provided certain conditions are met, limit
the fundamental Community objective of free trade. As detailed in Part In, the
SEA, TEU, the ECJ, and other Community institutions themselves actually
urge this approach. Nevertheless, stricter national laws in the environmental
sphere would not necessarily always prevail over free trade concerns; this
approach simply argues that where the requirements of nondiscrimination and
proportionality are met, 2 3  permitting Member States to enforce
environmental legislation furthers the Community's goals and is consistent
with Community law.
Another objection is that this approach would hinder rather than promote
the adoption of higher standards because it would relieve the pressure on
Member States favoring stricter standards to champion them on a Community
level. According to this position, forbidding derogations from Community
standards would place a greater burden on Member States to press Community
institutions to adopt the stricter measures.
This argument has two weaknesses. First, it erroneously assumes that
Member States view environmental problems from a national perspective -
"as long as we can enforce the standards we want in our country, we are not
concerned about the standards enforced in neighboring countries."
Environmental problems, however, are classically non-nationalist. They
typically have "spillover" effects in other countries that demand solution on a
regional, or even global, basis. Enforcement of high standards in one country
hence does not guarantee that the level of environmental protection will be
higher even in that country. Instead, effective protection often requires that
neighboring countries adopt the same measures.214
Thus, Member States that favor high environmental standards will not be
satisfied with enforcing such standards only on a national level. These States
will tolerate lax Community standards as an interim measure, but they will still
press for the adoption of their higher standards on a Community level. In
212. See, e.g., PCP, 1994 E.C.R. at 1834 (Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro).
213. See Wallonia Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 4479-80 (citing these two requirements but finding
national law consistent although it failed nondiscrimination test, because of special environmental risk
posed). Other environmental cases demonstrate that meeting the proportionality test is not an
insurmountable obstacle. See, e.g., Danish Bottles, 1988 E.C.R. at 4630-31 (finding test met as to part
of law but not as to other part of law); ADBHU, 1985 E.C.R. at 549.
214. The protection of water quality is an appropriate example. Unless a body of water is wholly
within one country, with no groundstream percolation from other countries, one country's enforcement
of high standards will be undermined if countries contiguous to the water do not employ similarly
stringent measures.
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addition, because adopting higher environmental standards typically results in
higher costs, a Member State that adopts such standards will want other
Member States to abide by the same rules so that it suffers no competitive
disadvantage. This economic rationale, together with Member States' interest
in minimizing spillover effects from lax environmental standards in
neighboring countries, ensures that Member States will continue to pressure the
Community to adopt stricter standards.
The argument's second weakness is its failure to consider the difficulty of
achieving a Community-wide consensus on environmental measures. Because
EC nations do not desire the same level of protection and differ in their ability
to maintain a given level of protection, some Member States will continue to
favor stricter standards than other Member States. To enact Community
environmental legislation despite this diversity of opinions, Member States
must make compromises; arguing that a Member State favoring a strict
standard must hold out for that standard at any cost will not solve the problem.
Were a Member State to hold out, needed environmental legislation might
never be passed, thereby permitting further deterioration in the environment.
Indeed, such concerns were the very impetus for introducing Article 1 00a with
its qualified majority voting requirement and the possibility for derogations
under Article 100a(4).
A final justification for ensuring the ability of Member States to enforce
stricter environmental measures arises not from Member States' imposition of
higher standards than the Community, but rather from Member States' failure
to transpose or enforce Community environmental standards."' As the head
of the legal service in the Commission's environmental division has observed,
"[t]he complete implementation and application in practice of the 200 or so
Directives and Regulations passed by the Community on environmental matters
is a problem in all Member States except Denmark." 216 This failure to
implement Community law is a significant obstacle to the achievement of the
Community's environmental objectives and has led the Commission to
commence a number of cases against Member States.2 7 Not all infractions
will be redressed, however, which contributes to a perception that Member
States can ignore Community environmental policy with impunity.21 1 The
215. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 59-60; see also Eleventh Annual Report to the European Parliament
on Monitoring the Application of Community Law, 1993 O.J. (C 154) 42-51 (listing numerous
environmental directives that have not been transposed into national law, are incorrectly transposed, or
are erroneously applied by Member States); Fiona Gaskin, The Implementation of EC Environmental
Law, 2 REv. EuR. COMMuNrrY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 335, 338 (1993) (tabulating complaints conceming
noncompliance or incorrect implementation).
216. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 59-60.
217. Id. Such cases include Case 134/86, Commission v. Belgium, 1987 E.C.R. 2415; Cases 96,
97/81, Commission v. The Netherlands, 1982 E.C.R. 1791 and 1819; Joined Cases 30 to 41/81, 1981
Commission v. Italy, E.C.R. 3379.
218. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 59 ("Nothing discredits a policy more than the introduction of rules
that are not observed.").
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continued recession in Europe accentuates this problem as environmental
measures, and their attendant costs, could be seen as unaffordable luxuries
under current economic conditions.
In light of these concerns, Member States should not be prevented from
enforcing stricter environmental standards. Such enforcement both is consistent
with and furthers underlying Community policies. Moreover, unlike the typical
case in which a Member State seeks to enforce different rules than the
Community in order to benefit local industries,219 environmental protection
measures generally do not confer competitive advantages on that particular
nation's industries.220 To the contrary, stricter environmental standards are
likely to impose competitive disadvantages because firms will incur costs in
complying with the measures that make them less competitive with firms in
Member States that do not have to incur those costs.
VI. PERMITTING MEMBER STATES TO IMPOSE STRICTER REQUIREMENTS
THAN COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
A. Interpreting the Scope of Articles 100a(4) and 130t in Light of the
Community's Commitment to Environmental Protection
As outlined above, the derogations provided by Articles 100a(4) and 130t
give rise to several questions about the scope of these articles. Resolution of
these questions will significantly affect the ability of Member States to rely on
the articles to enforce their stricter standards. This Article suggests resolving
these questions in the environmental sphere to maximize Member States'
ability to derogate from Community-wide standards. This approach is
consistent with, and perhaps mandated by, the repeated expressions in the TEU
of the Community's commitment to a high level of environmental protection.
Thus, when the scope of the derogations provided by Articles 100a(4) and 130t
is uncertain, the Community's strong commitment to the goal of maximum
environmental protection should guide resolution of the debate.
B. The Corollary: A Presumption Against Finding Harmonization
The corollary to a rule favoring a broad application of Articles 100a(4)
and 130t is a rule stating that when the scope of an area's harmonization is
ambiguous, the Community should resolve that doubt in light of its
219. In many Article 30 cases, Member States have attempted to impose technical standards to give
a competitive advantage to domestic products at the expense of foreign goods. See, e.g., Case 174/82
Officier van Justitie v. Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445; Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
220. One could, of course, argue that greater environmental cleanliness confers the competitive
advantages of benefiting industries such as tourism and recycling and benefiting those residents who
prefer cleaner environments despite the higher costs. In general, however, the imposition of higher
national standards will impose net economic costs on the implementing Member State.
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commitment to a high level of environmental protection. If the Community
were to apply such a rule, Member States would not need to comply with the
requirements in Articles 100a(4) and 130t, and more stringent national
measures would be permissible. Indeed, the only inquiry would be whether the
national measure violated Article 30. Where Community legislation is vague
about the scope of a minimum standard, the presumption should be that the
legislation creates a minimum standard from which Member States may freely
derogate in order to enact more protective measures.221
The treatment of harmonization in Enichem and London Boroughs Transit
is consistent with this proposed rule. Furthermore, London Boroughs Transit's
resolution of the Article 177 quandary, although criticized as a misapplication
of the ECJ's C.LL.F.LT. ruling, is an application of the same anti-
harmonization principles. However, at least one scholar has criticized this
approach on the grounds that it inappropriately relies on Article 130r rather
than Article 100, which is the legal basis of the directive in question.222 In
light of the need to take the Community's environmental commitment into
account when interpreting Community law, this criticism is unpersuasive.
Because harmonization questions are often difficult to resolve, they
provide an opportunity for result-oriented approaches. As one scholar has
commented, "this process in a sense involves discovering the intent of the
Community legislator, which immediately puts one on notice that it may be a
process of some sophistication, not to say sleight of hand. ' '21 Indeed, after
the ECJ's narrow reading of Article 100a in the PCP case, courts in other
Member States have great incentive to follow the United Kingdom's lead and
conclude that an area has not been harmonized, that Article 100a(4)'s
requirements are therefore not relevant, and that no reference to the ECJ is
warranted. In this manner, the harmonization issue could create a back door
allowing Member States to escape the effect of the Court's overly-restrictive
interpretation of Article 100a's requirements in the PCP case. Because such
a result would threaten the Community's legal structure by limiting the
possibility of judicial review, the better solution is for the national court to
allow the Article 177 reference and for the ECJ to confirm this approach to
harmonization issues in the environmental sphere. This result would ensure that
the Community's environmental protection objectives guide the resolution of
harmonization questions and that the structure of the Community's legal order
221. This rule would resemble the rule in American jurisprudence of a "presumption against
preemption" in areas traditionally regulated by the states. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
525 (1977) (stating that federal law does not supersede traditional state power unless pursuant to clear
and manifest purpose of Congress). This presumption includes such areas as health, education, and the
environment. In American law, concurrent regulation of such areas at the federal and state level is
therefore the norm; exclusive federal regulation is the exception. Although such a rule goes beyond what
is suggested here, it serves as a useful guide to the structures that have been found to work elsewhere.
222. Stephen Weatherill, Regulating the Internal Market: Result Orientation in the House of Lords,
EuR. L. REy. 299, 315-16 (1992).
223. Id. at 308.
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remains intact.
C. The Heresy: An Exception Permitting Member States to Impose Stricter
Environmental Standards
Articles 130t and 100a(4) are the only explicit exceptions to the rule that
Member States cannot adopt more stringent measures in areas in which the
Community has already acted. Member States can rely on these exceptions
only when one of those articles is the legal basis of Community legislation and
the Member State has complied with the requirements of those articles. When
the Community bases its legislation on other Treaty articles or when the
legislation does not meet the conditions of Articles 100a(4) or 130t, then
exclusive harmonization exists and Member States face the general prohibition
of more stringent national measures.
Creating an additional exception to the general prohibition would close
this gap. Such an exception would allow Member States to adopt or maintain
stricter national laws in a harmonized area even when they may not rely on
Article 100a(4) or 130t, provided that the stricter laws aim at environmental
protection."m This argument relies on the reasoning that justifies a broad
interpretation of Articles 100a(4) and 130t and a presumption against
harmonization. That is, the Community's commitment to environmental
protection justifies an interpretation of Community law that allows the
enforcement of stricter environmental measures. The environment retains its
"special status" even when Community legislation is based on provisions other
than Articles 100a and 130s. Therefore, the same derogations arguably should
apply when legislation relies on these other provisions. A Member State should
not be precluded from enforcing a national law that would better protect the
environment simply because the Community legislation is based on a different
provision.2 5
The primary argument against creating such an exception is that it would
threaten the cohesiveness of the Union by favoring unilateral Member State
action even if confined only to the environmental sphere. Nevertheless, the
224. The ECJ could adopt such an exception as a matter of policy and implement it on a case-by-
case basis. Member States favoring such an exception might also wish to lobby for its express inclusion
in the Treaty at the 1996 intergovernmental conference scheduled to amend the Treaty.
225. Community environmental legislation would normally be based on Article 100a or 130s
although the latter has become more common since the Court's Waste Directive decision, 1993 E.C.R.
964 (finding Article 130s was correct legal basis for waste directive because its primary purpose was
environmental protection), and the changes in the voting requirements under Article 130s. See supra note
15 and accompanying text. However, Community environmental legislation might rely on other Treaty
provisions such as Articles 75 or 113. See Paul Demaret, Environmental Policy and Commercial Policy:
The Emergence of Trade-Related Environmental Measures (TREMS) in the External Relations of the
European Community, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: ThE LEGAL
DIMENSION 305, 345-61 (Marc Marescan ed., 1993) (identifying Article 113 as proper legal basis for
TREMS).
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judicial creation of exceptions favoring greater Member State autonomy is not
unprecedented. The Cassis de Dijon jurisprudence created a category of
exceptions to Article 30 (in addition to those listed in Article 36) that permit
derogation from Community law. More recently, the ECJ's decision in
Wallonia Waste seems to have opened the Cassis de Dijon door a little
wider.226 Articles 100a(4) and 130t have likewise expanded the possibility
for Member States to derogate.
The "heresy" suggested here is that the environment's special importance
for the future of the European Community, as well as for the entire world,
justifies creating an exception to the rule mandating uniformity.227 To
minimize any threat to the cohesiveness of the Union, this exception would
need to be limited. One possibility is to follow the approach offered by Cassis
de Dijon as applied in the Danish Bottles case: the stricter law must be
necessary in order to achieve environmental protection, proportionate to the
burden placed on free trade, and nondiscriminatory. 228 The proposed
exemption would require courts to apply similar tests when analyzing the
"competence" question (does the Member State have competence to pass this
stricter measure?) and when analyzing the "compatibility" question (is this law
compatible with the free movement of goods?).
If the Community were to adopt this approach, the shift in thinking would
mirror a change that some scholars have argued has occurred in U.S.
constitutional law: the merging of questions of preemption (the U.S. equivalent
of the "competence" question) with questions of the burden on interstate
commerce (the U.S. equivalent of the "compatibility with Article 30"
question). One commentator describes the parallelism in the following manner:
Other cases in this area lend support to the theory that the [United States Supreme] Court
has adopted the same weighing of interests approach in pre-emption cases that it uses to
determine whether a state law unjustifiably burdens interstate commerce. In a number of
situations the Court has invalidated statutes on the preemption ground when it appeared that
the state laws sought to favor local economic interests at the expense of the interstate market.
On the other hand, when the Court has been satisfied that valid local interests, such as those
in safety or in the reputable operation of local business, outweigh the restrictive effect on
interstate commerce, the Court has rejected the pre-emption argument and allowed state
regulation to [stand.7 '
226. See Wallonia Waste, 1992 E.C.R. at 4471.
227. The Community's commitment to the subsidiarity principle, as well as its preference for
including safeguard clauses in new legislation pursuant to the Council Resolution on a "New Approach
to Technical Harmonization and Standards," 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, should gradually diminish the need
for recourse to such an exemption. See Weatherill, supra note 222, at 302. Nevertheless, the Scottish
Grouse case demonstrates that even where a safeguard provision exists, the Member State may not
always rely on it. Weatherill favors greater use of the minimum harmonization technique combined with
a duty on the Member States to share any innovations with other Member States. Id. at 303-04.
228. Whether Article 100a(4) also applies this test is still unclear after the PCP decision.
229. Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. RsV.
208, 220-21 (1959) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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This shift in approach is significant because it occurred in a genuine federal
system whose federal government enjoys far greater power than the
Community institutions, as opposed to the Community's hybrid system.
Moreover, the free movement of goods and supremacy of federal law are also
preeminent concerns in the U.S. system. If such a system can maintain unity
within the nation, despite providing for derogating state law, the European
Community should be able to achieve this result as well.
In addition, holding fast to the current rules may not preserve peace within
the Community. The current rules are likely instead to produce great dissent
within the Community as a result of the added voices of new Member States
and the EEA countries, all of whom have traditionally emphasized high
environmental standards. Those countries have stricter environmental laws than
the Community in several areas and fear having to lower their standards to
meet harmonized Community norms.uo The Court's PCP decision has
heightened such fears. Not only will these countries be loath to relinquish their
higher standards, but they may also seek to impose these standards on a
Community-wide basis. Member States that are unable to afford these
standards or that prefer lower standards for other reasons, such as the inability
or unwillingness of domestic industry to comply with higher standards, will
oppose such a program. In light of this likely scenario, an alternative approach,
addressing the needs of these new Union members and the EEA countries,
would be politically feasible and would preserve unity within the Union.
VII. CONCLUSION
While giving Member States the ability to enforce stricter standards
promotes the Community's objective of achieving a high level of
environmental protection, the optimal solution is the adoption of high
environmental standards on a Community rather than Member State level. This
result would ensure the most effective level of environmental protection and
would not endanger either the supremacy of Community law or. the free
movement of goods, services, or persons. Community-wide standards would
not require altering the accepted wisdom concerning stricter national standards
in harmonized areas or creating new exceptions to well-established rules.
However, because of the diversity of opinion among the Member States and
their differing abilities to support the cost of such' measures, the Community
cannot yet achieve this goal.
The question, therefore, is what to do in the interim, What will best insure
the attainment of the Community's environmental policies in light of this
diversity? Where the Community cannot reach a consensus regarding high
standards, Member States must still have an opportunity to impose such
standards on a national level. Allowing Member States this opportunity to
230. See Hoyer, supra note 12, at 3.
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enforce stricter standards can take several forms. Where legislation is based on
either Article 100a or 130s, Member States should be able to rely on the
derogations in Articles 100a(4) and 130t without having to meet high
evidentiary burdens. Further, the Community should resolve uncertainty about
the scope or requirements of Articles 100a(4) and 130t in favor of the Member
States' ability to maintain stricter standards.
Alternatively, if a Member State is unable to rely on one of those articles,
either because the relevant Community legislation has another legal basis or
because even under the suggested interpretation of those articles the Member
State has not met their requirements, the relevant question is whether the
Community legislation constitutes total harmonization in the area. This Article
suggests that when doubt exists regarding the scope of harmonization imposed
by a Community environmental measure, that doubt should be resolved against
harmonization. This method of analysis would expand the opportunities for
Member States to enforce more stringent standards without requiring them to
rely on Articles 100a(4) and 130t.
Finally, where harmonization of an area is unquestionable and reliance on
Articles 100a(4) and 130t is not possible, this Article suggests carving an
exception out of the general rule. Such an exception would permit Member
States to enforce stricter environmental laws even in harmonized areas if they
are necessary, proportional, and nondiscriminatory. 1 While the proposed
exception would constitute a significant departure from established Community
law, the Community's recognition of the environment's special importance and
its commitment to achieving a high level of environmental protection justify
this change. Like other modifications of established Community law, this
change would not only assist the Community in achieving its stated goals, but
might also prove politically necessary to resolve conflicts among the Member
States over Community legislation.
These suggestions all aim at judicial solutions; legislative and
administrative means for promoting this same objective already lie within the
reach of the Member States themselves and the Community's legislative
institutions. Member States should seek to persuade the Community's
institutions to use 130s as a legal basis for high environmental standards, rather
than 100a, because of the former's less burdensome requirements for
derogation. Community environmental measures should include express
provisions that permit Member States to impose higher standards. 2 Finally,
Member States should seek to establish concrete means for ensuring
observance of Article 130r(2)'s commitment to a "high level of environmental
protection" and its mandate to integrate environmental protection requirements
231. The proposed exception would go beyond Cassis deDijon because it would allow derogations
from Community law even after an area has been harmonized.
232. The directive at issue in Scottish Grouse contained such a provision although in that case the
Member State's law did not fall within the derogation. 1990 E.C.R. at 2163-64.
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into Community policies. 3
The central objection to allowing Member States a broader opportunity to
enforce stricter environmental standards is that this opportunity would subvert
the objective of free trade and thereby jeopardize the Community framework.
This objection, while serious, must be evaluated in terms of the Community's
development as a whole and the changes to the Treaty of Rome reflecting that
development. While guaranteeing the free movement of goods will always be
an important Community objective, the promotion of free trade at the cost of
other objectives would ultimately limit the Community and its goal to develop
into a true Union. Preserving the traditional hierarchy of Community objectives
not only frustrates the Community's own expansion, but also contradicts the
spirit and purpose of the changes the SEA and TEU made to the Treaty of
Rome. By contrast, an approach that balances free trade goals against other
important Community objectives such as environmental protection would allow
the Community to broaden its scope and fulfill its commitments under the
Treaty. From this broader perspective on the Community's objectives, the
suggestions offered in this Article are consistent with both the Treaty and the
Community's own development.
233. The Commission's Internal Communication of June 2, 1993 requires the designation of an
official within each Commission DG who is responsible for ensuring respect of the integration
requirement in Commission policies and proposals. See Cameron & Mackenzie, supra note 11, at 16-17.
Member States should monitor whether such designations are an effective means of fulfilling this
requirement. Member States should also consider lobbying for an administrative rule that DG XI (the
Commission's environmental division) have primary responsibility for evaluating Article 100a(4)
notifications that are based on environmental grounds. The present system, by contrast, allows the
Commission's Secretary General to decide which DG is responsible for evaluation and preparation of
the Commission's draft decision. Such a rule would better ensure that these evaluations give
environmental considerations proper weight
1995]

